ࡱ>  >ebjbj ;hh ]3p p 8(Q(   UUUPPPPPPPDSUdPUUUUUP  HP(((U  P(UP((KDO ` /M&PP0(QUMfJV%fJVLOOJVOUU(UUUUUPP3'rUUU(QUUUUJVUUUUUUUUUp y: PUBLIC SUBMISSION TO CHARGE RULES ISSUES PAPER FOR IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATORS BY COLEAMBALLY IRRIGATION CO-OPERATIVE LTD [ABN 16358861584] ON THE 15TH JULY, 2008 Coleambally Irrigation Co-operative Ltd PO Box 103 7 Brolga Place COLEAMBALLY NSW 2707  Abbreviations and acronyms used in this submission ԭAustralian Competition and Consumer CommissionCICLColeambally Irrigation Co-operative LimitedMEERAModern Engineering Equivalent Replacement AssetWMAWater Management Act 2000 (NSW) Questions Question 1 Are there any matters not mentioned above that are relevant in establishing a methodology for determining prices consistent with the objectives and principles of the Act? As a customer owned co-operative, CICL has a built in feedback system that achieves all of the aspects that the proposed regulations seek to achieve. Therefore, we see any regulation as duplication of an existing process that works very well. Question 2 Are there any issues the ԭ should be aware of in relation to service standards? Provide details including: a) to what extent the proposed level of service is or should be communicated to customers during the price-setting process b) the role of customers when establishing service standards c) the role of customers in determining the balance between the level of prices and the standard of service d) the extent to which service standards are, or should be, reported publicly e) the extent to which service standards form, or should form, part of a customer service contract f) the types of service standards that currently exist. Again, all this occurs naturally as part of the structure of a grower owned co-operative. Question 3 Are there any issues the ԭ should be aware of in relation to legislative and regulatory obligations? Provide details, including: a) to what extent obligations are, or should be, clearly articulated by regulators and government b) the types of obligations placed on operators c) how the obligations currently placed on operators are, or should be, funded d) the extent to which obligations are applied consistently across the basin CICL believes that all obligations that exist in current legislation and through shareholders expectation and control are enough to meet all the goals of the NWI. Question 4 In transitioning towards upper bound pricing: a) What factors may influence the path or pace of transition? How might these factors be addressed? b) Are there circumstances in which upper bound pricing cannot or should not be achieved? The transitioning to Upper Bound Pricing (or any level of pricing) will be influenced by the factors that have always influenced CICL we are answerable to our customer/shareholders. Similarly, if our customer/shareholders determine a price level that is not upper bound, then that is where we will go. Monopoly rents realistically will not happen within a co-operative structure. Question 5 To what extent are the two approaches applied consistent with the conditions listed above? Are there any issues that the ԭ should be aware of when considering the two approaches? Provide details, such as: a) the current approach, or what might be considered an appropriate approach, for determining forward-looking capital expenditure needs b) whether forward-looking expenditure programs are independently audited and, if so, at what frequency c) what type of expenditure is suited to the renewals annuity approach d) the period over which the renewals annuity and regulatory asset base expenditures are discounted and included in prices e) how often the renewals annuity and associated bank surpluses or deficits are adjusted f) what discount rate (or rate of return) is used under both approaches g) what factors should be taken into account in determining the discount rate h) whether there are any inhibitors to using the weighted average cost of capital as the discount rate and whether it is appropriate to use this approach i) whether any operators recover a value of past investments in future prices Independent MEERA and actuarial assessment conducted every five years to determine size of renewals annuity. Details previously supplied to ԭ. Question 6 Are there any issues that the ԭ should be aware of in relation to asset valuation? Provide details, such as: a) how operators currently finance capital investmentswhether it is solely through the renewals annuity or through a combination of the annuity and separate contracts with certain customers (maintaining a separate asset base for pricing purposes) b) under the regulatory asset base approach how existing assets should be valued c) in what circumstances might it be reasonable to revalue assets under the regulatory asset base approach? d) Are there any characteristics of irrigation assets that lend themselves to any particular asset valuation methodology? We value our assets every five years through an independent consultant using a MEERA approach. CICL uses a renewals annuity approach to asset replacement capital expenditure. In cases where capital works needs exceed available funds, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to borrow against the assets. For this reason, our capital works are self funded. This is done through a mutual co-operative (CIMCL). CICL would like to continue with the MEERA/renewals annuity approach we are familiar with it and our systems work with it. CICL does not want to go down the regulatory asset base approach. Most, if not all, irrigation infrastructure is best served by asset replacement values as current valuations are meaningless in that the assets have no intrinsic value (you could not buy or sell them as they are usually just a hole in the ground). Question 7 Are there any issues that the ԭ should be aware of in relation to taxation? Provide details, including: a) whether operators are subject to either the Federal Income Tax or National Tax Equivalent Regimes? b) the implications for prices where varying tax obligations apply across the Basin c) the extent to which taxation liabilities are calculated in a manner similar to the table above and details of any differences d) any relevant issues, rulings, or tax laws that may influence the estimation of taxable income for the purpose of constructing a revenue requirement for pricing e) examples of where a significant, inexorable, real tax timing disadvantage has been experienced from the receipt of termination fees CICL is subject to Federal Income Tax (30%). Levies collected by CIMCL are not (mutuality). As a Not for Profit co-operative our long term aim is to make no profit and therefore pay no tax. Consequently, there should be little difference to other entities (non taxed) across the basin Not done. No One customer currently holds more than 20,000ML of entitlement within CICL. They wish to take that out. This equates to a termination fee of over $6 million (CICL + CIMCL) pre tax uplift. Our annual operating budget is in the order of $9-10 million and our aim is no profit. We have to bring that termination fee into our income and it will therefore attract 30% income tax as it is too large to offset against our typical expenditure. The entitlement is about 4% of our total entitlement. Where only small amounts (less than 250 ML) are traded out the impact is negligible and the real tax timing disadvantage can be absorbed. But, with large amounts like this (and they may be higher if COAG lifts the 4% limit) the real tax timing disadvantage is very close to the 30%. Our options are: Have varying degrees of tax uplift depending on the quantity traded out (administrative nightmare) Have a fixed tax uplift to account for the worst case scenario (30%) and apply it to all (CICLs approach). Note that the 30% real tax timing disadvantage results in an uplift of 42.8% because the tax is applied on the uplifted amount. Question 8 To what extent do operators prepare, or should operators prepare, plans and undertake consultation processes for future capital and operating expenditure requirements? Where possible, provide details, including details of: a) the consultation process undertaken by operators when developing capital and operating plans, and the role of customers in this process b) independent review of asset management plans and operating and capital plans, and to what extent these reviews ensure that prices are based on prudent and efficient expenditure c) how often independent reviews are undertaken d) the role, if any, of independent consultants in the preparation of plans e) to what extent the results of independent reviews are, or should be, made public and reflected in prices f) programs currently in place, or that should be in place, to improve productivity and efficiency over time. CICL customers/shareholders dictate to the co-operative any future plans. That is the nature of a co-operative and therefore the community consultation is very extensive. Independent reviews are done if they are seen as necessary by the CICL customers/shareholders . See b) above. See b) above. As required by customers/shareholders. CICL has a $9M commitment as part of a $22M Water Smart Australia project. Question 9 What principles and approaches are most appropriate when allocating fixed or common costs of irrigation delivery services (i.e. those costs that do not vary with the volume of water supplied)? Provide details, including: a) to what extent embedded cross-subsidies or community service obligations (CSOs) currently exist within irrigation networks; in what circumstances and to what extent such cross-subsidies or CSOs should be maintained in perpetuity; and what processes are, or could be, used to reduce or eliminate cross subsidies and CSOs b) to what extent current charges do, and whether they should, reflect a uniform or postage stamp pricing policy c) to what extent current charges do, and whether they should, reflect the costs of providing services to different segments of the market CICL has CSOs that we dont get paid for. We would be happy if they were removed CICLs charges are postage stamp incorporating supply and drainage into one charge. To do otherwise is too difficult to manage. The only different charges represent different delivery reliabilities. High Security: 12 months of the year General Security: ~9 months of the year G Class: 2 runs (2 weeks each) per year Question 10 To what extent and in what circumstances should the setting of fixed and volumetric charges be allowed to deviate from the underlying (fixed and variable) cost structure of the operator? This does not apply to CICL as we are moving to align our water charging with our cost structure ie 98% fixed. Question 11 To what extent is pricing used as a cash management tool or insurance fund for irrigators? Are operators best placed to provide this service? What are the practical implications for the trade of water under such a pricing arrangement? Our irrigators have the ability to use our bill as a de facto overdraft. This can come about because the interest rate we charge is set in the Water Act (WMA) as the Supreme Court rate (currently 10%), which can be lower than commercial overdraft rates. Although we suspect it happening we dont believe that it happens much. Question 12 What progress has been made in the implementation of the access, exit and termination fee protocol to schedule E of the Murray Darling Basin Agreementspecifically in relation to the creation of delivery entitlements? CICL has completed implementation of the schedule E protocol by creating delivery entitlements by converting 1 for 1 from water entitlements. Note that this implementation is in line with the protocol in the MDBA not the protocol included as Appendix C. Question 13 To what extent and in what circumstances does the creation of explicit delivery entitlements impact the operation of irrigation networks? More specifically: a) are there expected benefits in terms of utilising spare capacity through trade in delivery entitlements? What advantages or disadvantages have resulted from the creation of explicit delivery entitlements? b) What practical issues and constraints might be involved in defining, measuring and monitoring explicit delivery entitlements? Can service standards (e.g. flow rates) be assigned to such entitlements? Previous practice with CICL (distributions, rationing on entitlement), means that creation of explicit Delivery Entitlements has had minimal inpact. Unclear about the trade benefits as yet. Mostly disadvantage from the workload of defining and managing DE We are still working our way through that. Question 14 To what extent have the specific provisions of schedule E for dealing with explicit delivery entitlements been met by operators? Provide details including: a) instances where specific requirements in relation to delivery entitlements are imposed upon the transfer of water access entitlements. If this is the case, in what circumstances and for what purpose have such arrangements been adopted? b) instances where operators do not offer the option of paying delivery access charges once a water access entitlement is traded. Practice is as per schedule E protocol Question 15 To what extent and in what circumstances are the security provisions within schedule E applied by operators? Provide details including: a) To what extent do irrigators who elect to maintain their delivery entitlement following the sale of their water entitlement present a risk to the revenue security of an operator? b) What security arrangements are currently used by operators? Do restrictions exist in terms of the percentage of a permanent water entitlement that can be traded before a termination fee is required? c) Do current security provisions reflect an appropriate balance between the credit risk faced by the operator and the interests of the irrigator? d) Are existing legal remedies for the recovery of debts adequate for operators to manage their credit risks? Are there impediments that limit an operators ability to enforce any contractual arrangements? e) Is there scope to use other forms of security such as unmortgaged land or bank guarantees where an irrigator elects to maintain their delivery right after the sale of their water entitlement? f) Should the amount of any security collateral requested be capped? If so, why and to what extent? g) Are operators in a position to assess the extent to which particular irrigators represent a credit risk? The whole security question is one of our biggest concerns. We are applying the schedule E protocol provisions option to continue access fees up to 50% etc. Assessing and managing security risks are advanced skills we have not had within our business in the past. Therefore we are having to develop them from scratch. That is a big job for a small co-operative such as ours. Still working on it. Question 16 To what extent have the provisions of schedule E in relation to prohibiting the levying of exit been adhered to by operators? More specifically (where possible, provide details of current practices): a) are exit fees levied by operatorsfor instance, is a fee payable upon transfer of a permanent water entitlement rather than the surrendering or termination of a delivery entitlement? b) are there instances where operators require the termination of delivery entitlements, and payment of termination fees, as a condition for the transfer of a permanent water entitlement? CICL has no exit fees When more than 50% of water entitlement is sold off a property and transferred out of the licence Question 17 In relation to the levying of fees and charges, do access fees recover an operators fixed costs and do operators calculate a separate levy for infrastructure service improvements? The service improvements that CICL has planned are included in the access fee in compliance with section 10.2 of the schedule E protocol. The issues paper appendix C is the wrong version of the schedule E protocol on access, exit and termination fees. The protocol that was approved as part of the MDB agreement is below (starts p73):  HYPERLINK "http://www.mdbc.gov.au/__data/page/114/MDB_Agreement_Schedule_E_with_protocols.pdf" http://www.mdbc.gov.au/__data/page/114/MDB_Agreement_Schedule_E_with_protocols.pdf The major difference is Section 10.2 around the calculating of access fees (and therefore termination fees). For CICL this is a major difference as we have committed to $9M of system improvement works over 4 years that can be included in the access (and termination) fees under the approved protocol. Under the protocol attached to the issues paper this $9M has to be excluded. The trusting person in me would say that it is an honest mistake by the ԭ the cynic in me would be worried that the hidden agenda of the ԭ is to have this clause changed. Question 18 What factors impact on the choice to levy a separate fee or charge outside the renewals annuity? See response to question 17. Question 19 Have all operators adopted a multiple of 15 times the annual access fee? CICL has adopted a 15 times the actual annual access fee (on delivery entitlements) for calculation of the termination fee. We are still debating adopting the same multiplier on annual access fees (meter outlets). Question 20 Have any operators made an allowance in termination fees for avoidable costs associated with the surrendering or termination of a delivery entitlement? CICL believes that the avoidable costs are very small and therefore have not made an allowance for them. Question 21 Which multiple/number of years (if any) represents a reasonable balance between removing potential barriers to trade and providing a sufficient timeframe for operators to adjust to new trade patterns, receive the appropriate investment signals and efficiently rationalise irrigation networks? CICL believes that the 15 times multiplier is a reasonable balance. Question 22 Aside from transitional issues, are there any circumstances under which a shadow access fee should be retained? No. CICL has moved to actual access fees. Question 23 Are there instances where termination fees or charges applying to delivery entitlements are calculated on a basis other than an actual or shadow access fee as specified in schedule E? What practical or other reasons account for such practices? No. Question 24 Would operators be at a competitive disadvantage by having lower actual delivery access and termination fees? Provide details. Unsure. Hard to tell until the whole water industry and market settles down. Question 25 Are taxation adjustments made to termination fees? On what basis are they made? CICL has a fixed tax uplift to account for the worst case scenario (30%) and applied it to all. Note that the 30% real tax timing disadvantage results in an uplift of 42.8% because the tax is applied on the uplifted amount. See response to Question 7e for details and basis. Question 26 To what extent do operators levy both regulated and unregulated water charges? More specifically (provide details where possible): a) do operators provide services and levy charges in respect of services unrelated to access to their irrigation network? b) do operators provide access to their network for the purpose of supplying both rural and urban customers? c) do operators provide access to their network for basin water resources and non-basin water resources? d) what practical issues might arise by virtue of water charge rules not applying to some of the activities of those operators referred to in the preceding points (i.e. regulatory accounting issues)? CICL levies a small number of stock and garden siphons whose flow rate is too small to meter (we account for it by estimation). We also charge ~30 customers for access to opportunistic flows on our drainage system. Apart from those all our extractions are regulated. Again, CICL believes that its co-operative structure eliminates the need for invasive charging rules Question 27 To what extent and in what circumstances, should the water charge rules apply to all operators to the same degree? More specifically: a) should any distinctions between classes of operators be based on the number of customers serviced, the volume of entitlements held, the size of the irrigation network or another characteristic of the operator? b) is there merit in a delayed application of the water charge rules for specific classes of operators? If so, on what basis should operators be classified? CICL believes it is compliant to this point and therefore has no opinion on the application of water charging rules. Question 28 What factors should be considered when making rules about transition arrangements? More specifically: a) what length of time between the making of water charge rules and the commencement of water charge rules would provide adequate opportunity to operators and their customers to adjust to new arrangements? b) are there any other transitional matters that the water charge rules should take into consideration? See response to Question 27. Question 29 To what extent are regulated water charges payable to operators currently monitored and reported? For CICL this is covered in the monitoring and reporting to our customer/shareholders that is a normal part of operating our business. The level is determined by what our customer/shareholders want. Question 30 Are there any other issues that the ԭ should be aware of in developing and implementing arrangements to monitor compliance? The phrase change fatigue has been quoted to me and sums up the feelings of anyone who has worked in this industry for the last decade or more (especially in NSW where we have been through a privatisation process as well). We are only small organisations and the burden of change is wearing us down. Also, a strange thought came to me: the private irrigation entities are more like good government answerable to and controlled by their customers, providing the service they desire at the lowest price possible and taking no profits The government irrigation entities are more like bad private enterprise not answerable to or controlled by their customers, providing the minimum service at the highest price their customers will tolerate and taking profits Bizarre! Question 31 What considerations are relevant to establishing measures to mitigate the risk of perverse or unintended outcomes? More specifically: a) how long after the commencement of the water charge rules should a comprehensive review of the water charge rules as a whole occur? Who should undertake this review, and should the process for changing the water charge rules to address the outcomes of the review be the same as the current process for developing the rules? b) if the water charge rules were to confer a decision-making power onto some entity (for example, the determination of termination fees by the ԭ), what criteria should that entity use in deciding whether to vary or revoke a decision? CICL believes that our governance structure is good and that we are doing a good job. The only perverse and unintended outcomes we fear are more regulation and interference that makes it harder for us to do our job and delivers no benefit to anyone.     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