ࡱ>  q 8bjbjt+t+ )AA<~] L  8$ 4X UF L (    >B V GUIUIUIUIUIUIU$VX`mU b   b b mU   b    GU b GU2 M GU  |U: *T Draft Pricing of unconditioned local loop services (ULLS) and review of Telstras proposed ULLS charges Discussion Paper August 2000 Preface Under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the Act), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the Commission) is responsible for arbitrating disputes about access to particular declared services and also for assessing access undertakings relating to access to such declared services. One of the prime issues that arise under these processes is the determination of an appropriate access price. The Commission declared the unconditioned local loop service (ULLS) in July 1999. ULLS involves the use of unconditioned cable, primarily copper pairs, between end-users and a telephone exchange, where the copper terminates. Telstra is the predominant supplier of this service, having ownership and control of the copper customer access network located throughout Australia. As a new service, it should not be surprising that there will be considerable debate in the industry about the appropriate pricing of the ULLS. In this context, the Commission considers it would be appropriate to inform the market as to its thinking on various methodological issues surrounding the pricing of this service and, in addition, to provide some preliminary views about the various pricing claims that have been made, particularly by Telstra, in relation to this service. In this regard, Telstra announced proposed charges for the declared ULLS in June 2000, which involved a number of components; including a connection charge, a monthly rental charge and other components relating to service quality and provisioning times. The response from access seekers to these charges, particularly in relation to the monthly rental, was that these were well above analogous line cost estimates determined as part of the Commissions n/e/r/a-based network costing work conducted for the assessment of Telstras PSTN undertaking. Some access seekers argued that these line costs were equally relevant to the determination of appropriate ULLS charges. The Commissions sees it as important from a competition perspective to ensure that the declared ULLS is provided by Telstra on a timely basis to access seekers in order to promote the provision of new voice and data based services to consumers on a competitive basis. This also involves ensuring the price of the declared service is consistent with legislative criteria. To this end, this paper examines two distinct but related matters. First, it considers the appropriate pricing methodology that should be used to determine access charges for the supply of declared ULLS. Second, the paper provides an indication of the Commissions preliminary view of appropriate ULLS charges, having regard to the application of its preferred methodology to the costing work recently undertaken by the Commission in the context of Telstras PSTN undertaking assessment. This work on Telstras network costs was a substantial methodological and quantitative exercise by the Commission and took more than two years to complete. The Commission appreciates that Telstra and interested parties wishing to access this service are currently engaged in negotiations over the terms of supply to the ULL, and that the pricing of the service is one of the more significant issues in these deliberations. In addition, a number of access seekers have now notified the Commission of an access dispute under Division 8 of Part XIC of the Act in relation to the pricing of the ULLS, which separately requires the Commission to arbitrate each dispute by making a pricing determination. However, even parties who have notified a dispute are not prevented from continuing to negotiate with Telstra on the terms and conditions of supply to the ULLS, indeed they are encouraged to do so. Against this rather complex background of on-going negotiations and progressing of arbitrations running in parallel, the Commission is concerned that the views set out in this paper neither chill genuine commercial negotiations nor prejudice the interests of those parties to particular arbitration disputes which are currently in hand. The Commissions intention in releasing this paper at this critical juncture, as the commercial supply of the ULLS is imminent, is to provide guidance and assistance to both Telstra and access seekers who are negotiating access for the supply of ULLS. It is hoped this will avoid lengthy and protracted disputes and a large number of arbitrations. More particularly, the Commission considers that where the parties negotiating positions on the pricing of the ULLS are quite far apart, as noted above, it is important that the Commission, through the injection of further relevant information to the market, can assist to close the current range of price expectations for supply of this service. In so doing, the Commission expects that this will assist the parties to reach agreement more quickly than would otherwise be the case. It should be noted that the views expressed in this paper are preliminary and are neither the concluded view of the Commission nor binding on the Commission as it may be constituted for any particular arbitration. The Commission invites submissions from interested parties on this draft paper. Written submissions should be provided to the Commission by 15 September 2000. Please forward any written submissions to: Chris Pattas Senior Director Access Telecommunications Australian Competition and Consumer Commission GPO Box 520J Melbourne VIC 3001 Further Inquiries: Chris Pattas (03-9290 1858/ 0410 610 327) or Stephen Farago (03 9290 1832) Fax: 03-9663 3699 E-mail: Chris.Pattas@accc.gov.au Submissions should also be provided in electronic form to the above e-mail address. Submissions will be treated as public documents unless otherwise specified. Parties wishing to lodge only confidential submissions are advised to discuss this with staff prior to lodgment. Chapter 1: The declared service The Commission announced its decision to declare the unconditioned local loop service (ULLS) in July 1999. ULLS involves the use of unconditioned cable, such as copper pairs, between end-users and a telephone exchange, where the copper terminates. Telstra is the predominant supplier of this service, having ownership of the copper customer access network located throughout Australia. Declaration of the unconditioned local loop service enables service providers to connect their own networks to existing infrastructure in order to deliver new and innovative services to end-users more efficiently. This reduces the need for full duplication of communications networks, while encouraging service providers to roll out their own infrastructure where this is efficient. Supply of the ULLS on reasonable terms and conditions should to promote the competitive provision of a variety of high speed voice and data-based services. This includes services such as local and long-distance telephone calls, Internet access, tele-working, distance learning, video-on-demand, remote LAN access and other multi-media and data applications. The Commission expects that declaration of ULLS will also promote retail service competition and provide end-users with the choice between local call suppliers. Also, declaration is expected to help roll out of new infrastructure, where this is efficient, through lowering entry barriers and reducing investment risks. Services to end-users will be able to be provided at speeds many times faster than possible by todays analogue modems, and at prices lower than if these were provided or controlled by a single supplier. In particular, the Commission expects that the benefits of new high speed services will occur more quickly and across a broader customer and geographic base, particularly for residential and small business users outside of CBD areas. Competition by a wide range of players provides a superior way of meeting the new more sophisticated telecommunications needs of consumers and businesses. Additional competition in the market for high bandwidth services is important as the ԭ expects there to be significant demand by both residential and business end-users for these services. Competing firms can add their own carriage technology to the cable, and provide an alternative source of high bandwidth services which is likely to yield greater and more sustainable competition benefits. Opening up access to the unconditioned local loop service is also expected to encourage investment in xDSL technology and data networks. Significantly, the extent of these benefits will depend to a large degree on the terms and conditions of access, including the pricing of this service. In particular, a higher price than is efficient will result in a lower expected take up of this service and lesser benefits to end users from the provision of competitive voice and data-based services. Too low a price on the other hand will likely lead to an inefficiently high use of Telstras access network, even where suitable alternative technologies are readily available. These important considerations on determining the efficient pricing of ULLS are covered in the following chapters of this paper. In order for the ULL to be used by competing firms to provide high bandwidth services there are a range of technical and operational issues which need to be resolved. These issues have been progressed by various industry groups and are now nearing completion. This has involved: development of technical and network rules dealing with spectral compatibility and the deployment of services using xDSL technology on the local loop (such rules are designed to limit interference between services); development of operational procedures relating to the pre-ordering, ordering and provisioning of the unconditioned local loop service as well as the handling and rectification of faults (these are designed to streamline transfer of services between providers and establish clear responsibilities for dealing with faults between providers); revisions to technical standards and codes for customer equipment and cabling to ensure they are compatible with xDSL equipment; and development of principles or rules dealing with service migration as a result of changes to the customer access network architecture (these rules are designed to provide greater certainty to providers in the event of subsequent change to local loop networks). What is the ULLS Under Telstras customer access network architecture, customers are connected to the broader network by means of cabling which runs from a customers premises to what is known as Customer Access Module (CAM) equipment. The CAM equipment does not necessarily undertake switching; rather its function is to provide battery feed, ring current and dial tone to the customer premises equipment. CAM equipment includes remote switching units or stages (RSUs/RSSs), remote (and integrated remote) integrated multiplexers (RIMs/IRIMs) or newer generation remote customer multiplexers (C-MUXs). In some areas, notably in CBDs, customers are directly connected to local access switches (LAS) which effectively serves as the CAM in this case. Under Telstras customer network architecture, the CAM can then be connected (directly, or by means of other CAM equipment) to a Local Access Switch (LAS) and/or a data/IP network. Voice traffic is currently routed to the LAS for carriage using a circuit switched network, whilst data traffic is routed to a data/IP network (not separately shown). This is illustrated  REF _Ref488557090 \p \h  \* MERGEFORMAT below in  REF _Ref488557060 \h  \* MERGEFORMAT Figure 1.  Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 1: Use of the ULLS (Source: AdvaTel) In Declaration of local telecommunications services (the report accompanying the declaration of the ULLS), the ULLS is described as: the service for the use of copper-based communications wire between the boundary of a telecommunications network and a point where the copper terminates. In terms of  REF _Ref488557060 \h  \* MERGEFORMAT Figure 1, therefore, the ULLS refers to the unconditioned twisted copper pairs that connect a customers premises to the nearest CAM. Hence, in the case of full unbundling of the local loop, the link between the MDF and the CAM is re-connected to become a link to the access seekers CAM. Chapter 2: Legislative Criteria The object of Part XIC of the Act is to promote the long-term interests of end-users (LTIE) of carriage services or of services provided by means of carriage services. This will be achieved, in part, through establishing the rights of third parties to gain access to services which are necessary for competitive services to be supplied to end-users. In considering whether declaration of a service, approval of an access code or an access undertaking or the making of an arbitration determination will be in the long-term interests of end users, the Commission must have regard to the achievement of the following objectives: promoting competition in markets for telecommunications services; achieving any-to-any connectivity in relation to carriage services that involve communication between end-users; and encouraging the economically efficient use of, and the economically efficient investment in, the infrastructure by which telecommunications services are supplied. An important consideration in ensuring that access to declared services is in the long-term interests of end users through achievement of the above objectives is whether the terms and conditions of access (including the price or a method for ascertaining the price) are reasonable. Under Part XIC the Commission cannot approve a draft TAF access code or accept an undertaking unless satisfied that the terms and conditions specified are reasonable. In determining whether terms and conditions are reasonable, regard must be had to the following matters: whether the terms and conditions promote the long-term interests of end-users of carriage services or of services supplied by means of carriage services; the legitimate business interests of the carrier or carriage service provider concerned, and the carriers or providers investment in facilities used to supply the declared service concerned; the interests of persons who have rights to use the declared service concerned; the direct costs of providing access to the declared service concerned; the operational and technical requirements necessary for the safe and reliable operation of a carriage service, a telecommunications network or a facility; and the economically efficient operation of a carriage service, a telecommunications network or a facility. This does not, by implication, limit the matters to which regard may be had. When arbitrating access disputes the Commission must have regard to the same matters. In addition, the Commission must take into account in making a determination the value to a party of extensions, or enhancement of capability, whose cost is borne by someone else. Access prices and the processes of competition, which Part XIC harnesses, should encourage suppliers to produce the kinds of services most highly valued by end-users, improve customer choice of services and service quality, and supply services in the least-cost way. The discussion below briefly interprets these legislative criteria from the perspective of access pricing. A more detailed discussion is in the 1997 Access Pricing Principles paper. Long-term interests of end-users The long-term interests of end-users will, in general, be promoted by lower prices (that are sustainable), higher quality of service and greater choice of products. These outcomes will be promoted by: competition in markets for telecommunications services; any-to-any connectivity; and encouraging the economically efficient use of, and investment in, telecommunications infrastructure. Promoting competition in markets for telecommunications services Part XIC is concerned with promoting competition in those markets that are dependent on the services of telecommunications infrastructure (dependent markets). Where existing conditions do not already provide for the competitive supply of these services, Part XIC (including the pricing of access) aims to facilitate access to these services to encourage the efficient entry of firms and efficient competition in dependent upstream or downstream markets. Any-to-any connectivity Any-to-any connectivity is the ability of end-users of different networks to communicate. It benefits users by allowing users of one network to communicate with users of other networks. Access prices should not artificially discriminate against the users of any particular network in the provision of any-to-any connectivity and should encourage operators of different networks to configure their networks to promote any-to-any connectivity. Encouraging economically efficient use of, and investment in, telecommunications infrastructure The economically efficient use of, and investment in, infrastructure comprises three (interdependent) elements: Dynamic efficiency Firms have the appropriate incentives to invest, innovate, improve the range and quality of services, increase productivity and lower costs through time; Productive efficiency Firms have the appropriate incentives to produce services at least cost, and production activities are distributed between firms such that industry-wide costs are minimised; and Allocative efficiency Firms employ resources to produce goods and services that provide the maximum benefit to society. An important condition for allocative efficiency is that prices for services at least reflect the value society places on the next best alternative use of the resources used to produce the service. Dynamic efficiency will be promoted by an access price that provides a normal commercial return on investments and does not distort the build or buy decision. To encourage efficient investment in infrastructure (in the long term), an access price should be generally sufficient to cover the prudently incurred costs of providing infrastructure including a normal commercial return on investment. Productive efficiency will be promoted by an access price that allows for the more efficient sources of supply to displace the less efficient. An access price which encourages the entry of lower-cost (or higher quality) firms within these potentially competitive markets will promote productive efficiency throughout these integrated production chains. Allocative efficiency consists of a number of components. First, infrastructure should not be under- or over-utilised. Services to end-users should be produced so long as the value of societys resources used to provide those services does not exceed the value of the services to the users. Second, an access price should minimise distortions in the use of infrastructure. An access price should not artificially bias the use of one technology over another in the provision of a service or the production of a particular service over another. Legitimate business interests of the carrier or carriage service provider concerned Regard to the legitimate business interests of access providers requires the Commission to consider whether the access price would provide a normal commercial return on prudent investment. The services to which Part XIC will mostly apply are provided using highly capital intensive and specialised infrastructure, the costs of which are largely sunk before the service is provided. It is legitimate for the carrier or carriage service provider to seek to recover the costs of prudent investment from its commercial activities, including providing access. However, it is unlikely the legitimate business interests extend to achieving a higher than normal commercial return through the use of market power. For example, an access price should not, in most cases, be artificially inflated by the lack of competition in the supply of infrastructure services. Interests of persons who have rights to use the declared service In the Commissions view, persons who have rights to use the declared service have an interest in being able to compete for the custom of end users on the basis of their relative technical and commercial merits. This means the ability of an access seeker to compete in the supply of a service in a dependent market should be based on the cost and quality of its service relative to its competitors. For example, an access price should not artificially protect a vertically-integrated access provider from being displaced by a more efficient access seeker in a downstream market. The direct costs of providing access Direct costs are those costs necessarily incurred (caused by) the provision of access. An access price should not be inflated to recover any profits the access provider (or any other party) may lose in a dependent market as a result of the provision of access. As stated in the relevant explanatory memorandum: direct costs of providing access are intended to preclude arguments that the provider should be reimbursed by the third party seeking access for consequential costs which the provider may incur as a result of increased competition in an upstream or downstream market. Operational and technical requirements necessary for the safe and reliable operation of a carriage service, a telecommunications network or a facility An access price should not lead to arrangements between access providers and access seekers that will encourage the unsafe or unreliable operation of a carriage service, telecommunications network or facility. The economically efficient operation of a carriage service, a telecommunications network or facility This criterion is similar to the productive and allocative efficiency elements described above. An access price should encourage access providers to select the least-cost method of providing the service and provide those services most highly valued by access seekers. The criteria above are therefore interdependent and in most cases will be re-inforcing, ie. promoting one criterion will also promote another. In some cases, however, the criteria may lead to different efficient outcomes as between the short-term and the longer term. For example, telecommunications is an industry where the delivery of many services is characterised by economies of scale and scope. This could mean that an access price that promotes the economically efficient use of infrastructure in the short term may, in some cases, not encourage efficient investment in infrastructure over the long-term and may therefore not be consistent with the legitimate business interests of the access provider. It should also be noted, however, that the existence of significant economies of scope and scale may mean that it is not efficient to duplicate such infrastructure so that access prices which encourage efficient use may not deter efficient investment, particularly if the access price is cost based and includes a commercial return. This should also ensure that incentives for efficient investment are maintained. Chapter 3: Pricing Principles for Unconditioned local loop services The legislative criteria discussed in chapter 2 have been interpreted in terms of a set of broad access pricing criteria. The Commission in its July 1997 paper (Access Pricing Principles, Telecommunications A Guide) has accepted that pricing based on total service long run incremental cost (TSLRIC) determined to recover the efficient costs of a forward-looking network will satisfy the broad criteria, including the reasonableness criteria under section 152AH of Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act. These broad access pricing criteria have to be interpreted with respect to the peculiarities of different types of access sought. In October 1998 the Commission issued a discussion paper titled Pricing of Local Telecommunications Services, which looked at the appropriate pricing of A-side services such as the unbundled local loop (ULL). This chapter reviews the issues of local telecommunications services access pricing now that ULL prices have been proposed by Telstra. In particular it focuses on: The applicability of TSLRIC to ULL. The desirability or otherwise of de-averaging of prices across different geographic areas. Whether an access deficit contribution (ADC) is appropriate. Total Service Long-run Incremental Cost (TSLRIC) The concept of TSLRIC can be understood by breaking it up into its components: Total service refers to it being the cost of production of an entire service (or a production element) not to the cost of a particular unit. However, with respect to carriage services it is usually expressed on a per-minute basis by dividing the annual total service cost by the number of minutes carried. Long run refers to it being a long-run cost concept in contrast to a short-run one. In the short run the amount of at least one factor of production (usually capital equipment) is fixed, while in the long run all factors of production can be varied. Incremental cost means that it is a form of marginal cost, although not the more familiar marginal cost of the change in cost incurred through a change in the amount of output produced. (This is discussed further below.) It is also an attributable cost concept as it refers only to those costs that can be attributed to the production of the service. Costs common to more than one service cannot be attributed to a particular service and therefore do not form part of TSLRIC. However, in practice, it is sometimes defined to include a contribution to common costs (TSLRIC+) or to both common costs and an access deficit (TSLRIC++). The implications of these extended versions are discussed below. Given these attributes TSLRIC can be defined in the following alternative ways: It is the incremental or additional cost on an annual basis the firm incurs in the long run in providing a particular service (or production element) as a whole, assuming all of its other production activities remain unchanged. It is the total cost (on an annual basis) the firm would avoid in the long run if it ceased to provide the service as a whole. The TSLRIC of supplying a service can be expressed as the sum of the operating and maintenance costs, and the capital costs that the firm incurs in providing the service as a whole. Operating costs are the continuing operational costs of providing the service, including the labour and materials costs that are causally related to the provision of the service. Capital costs comprise the cost of capital (ie, the opportunity cost of debt and equity used to finance the firm) and depreciation (ie, the decline in economic value of assets) of capital that is specific to the production of the service. Relationship to More Common Incremental Cost Concepts The short-run incremental cost (SRIC) of supplying the service is the change in cost from changing the amount supplied, given that the availability of at least one factor of production is fixed. In contrast, TSLRIC comprises the annualised costs that an efficient firm would incur over the long run (all factors variable) in supplying the entire service in question as against abandoning it. TSLRIC therefore comprises the costs that an efficient firm would avoid over the long run if it ceased to supply the service, whereas SRIC is limited to those costs, which the firm would immediately avoid by reducing or abandoning output. Efficiency of Marginal Cost Pricing Under the familiar marginal cost pricing approach it is efficient to set price equal to marginal cost as that equates value in use to the economys sacrifice at the margin. Producing another unit would reduce efficiency because it costs the economy more than it is worth to users. Producing one less unit would also reduce efficiency because the saving in cost to the economy is less than the value in use of the foregone unit. This raises the question of whether the price for the service should be set by reference to SRIC or to TSLRIC. Setting price equal to SRIC may appear to be efficient in the short run as it appears to equate the marginal value of the user to what society gives up in supplying that unit. But this makes inadequate allowance for what the economy gives up in keeping the productive capacity alive or in expanding that capacity. Taking into account this shadow cost of maintaining and expanding that capacity as well as the actual operating cost involves use of TSLRIC as the pricing benchmark. Common Costs In its pure form, TSLRIC includes only those costs that can be attributed directly to the provision of the particular service. In addition to these attributable costs there may be costs of facilities that are shared between two or more services and are therefore unallocable to a particular service or are common to more than one service. Costs incurred in the provision of a group of services are incurred if any one of the services within the sub-group is produced and are not avoided unless the production of all the services in the group ceased. Hence, if the firm ceased to supply one service from that group, these costs would not all be avoided. This raises the issue of the recovery of these unattributable or common costs. This is the fundamental dilemma of public utility pricing the tension between the efficiency of relating use prices to marginal cost and the imperative of cost recovery. One way of meeting both objectives is by the use of two-part pricing with a component unrelated to use and use charged at TSLRIC. However, it is very difficult to conceive of two-part pricing being used for access pricing and this approach may also unduly raise the costs of new entry. In practice, therefore, TSLRIC has usually been interpreted to include a contribution to common costs. As common costs are not directly attributable to the production of any one service, the allocation of these costs across services is somewhat arbitrary and there is a range of possible methods of allocating them. One commonly used approach is the equi-proportionate mark-up over directly attributable costs. This involves measuring the directly attributable costs of each service within the group and allocating the common costs based on each services proportion of the total directly attributable costs. The common cost contribution is based on the application of percentage supplements to attributable capital asset value and direct operating and maintenance costs. This is the approach adopted by the Commission in its estimate of the efficient costs of Telstras originating and terminating PSTN services. Use of Forward Looking Costs Where there are different production technologies and network configurations either available or in use there are alternative ways of evaluating the cost components of TSLRIC. Broadly, costs could be based on the actual technology in use, the best-in-use technology or on forward-looking technology (as if the most efficient technology commercially available were used). The Commissions n/e/r/a cost model draws a distinction between the scorched node (rebuilding the existing network configuration) and scorched earth (building from scratch an optimised network) costing bases. In practice the Commission has tended to take a scorched node forward-looking approach using best-in-use technology. This amounts to a hybrid approach which combines the best technology currently available commercially with the existing network infrastructure. The Commission has defended the use of this approach rather than an actual cost approach on the following grounds: By penalising bad decisions and rewarding good ones, it provides stronger incentives for efficient investment decisions. It discourages the practice of the access provider cost-shifting from competitive areas to less competitive ones. Excessive access charges based on historic costs encourage access seekers to make inefficient build-buy decisions. In its pricing approach to ULL, Telstra appears to have based its charges on what it claims are the efficient costs of supplying the service using the existing customer access network architecture. Telstra has argued that while it has used the existing network architecture, its approach to ULL costing is not based on actual costs, but is consistent with a scorched node approach where the most efficient means of providing access to existing network POIs, ie at local exchange (RSS/RSU) or RIM points is used. This is different from the assumption in the n/e/r/a cost model that assumes a different network architecture, involving a higher number of RIMs and where interconnection and access is provided at higher levels of the network. The distinction, however, between the Telstra ULL approach and that adopted by the n/e/r/a model in terms of providing access at different levels in the network is not necessarily a choice between an optimised network and an actual network. In either case, it is possible to estimate the cost of connecting to a RIM or an RSS/RSU, the key difference being a larger number of RIMs in the optimised network resulting in a small reduction in total costs. Telstras approach to costing existing local exchange (RSS/RSU) and RIM points of presence appears appropriate for the ULL service as this provides a clearer signal to access seekers about where to obtain ULL access at the present time. The Commission therefore sees merit in there being separate prices for access at a RIM and at an RSS/RSU. Where access is actually provided at a RSS/RSU which (in the n/e/r/a model) has been replaced with a RIM, it may be inappropriate to set the price as if that involved interconnection at a RIM. Accordingly, the Commission considers it appropriate to modify the model to reflect the actual numbers and distribution of RSS/RSUs and RIMs that are being used to provide the ULLS. The effect of this change results in a slight increase in line costs and is discussed in Chapter 5. TSLRIC Conclusion In the past the Commission has adopted the TSLRIC approach to access pricing. As noted in Chapter 2, this is consistent with the requirements of Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act that requires that pricing reflects the direct costs of supply, takes account of the interests of the access provider and access seekers and encourages the economically efficient use of, and the economically efficient investment in, the infrastructure of telecommunications services. The Commission has also previously stated that TSLRIC is particularly appropriate for services that are well developed, necessary for competition in dependent markets and where the forces of competition work poorly in constraining prices. In the case of ULL, it is considered the service clearly meets each of these criteria. While this is a new service for access seekers, the service relates to the most basic building block in Telstras network, the copper CAN infrastructure which has been developed and in use for generations. As noted in Chapter 1, the service is a vital input for the provision of a variety of voice and high-bandwidth data services and is one in which Telstra is the predominant supplier of the service throughout Australia. The Commission, therefore, considers that TSLRIC should be applied in the costing of provision of the ULL service. De-Averaging of Access Prices Differences in costs in different geographical locations have been reflected in previous access pricing decisions for domestic PSTN originating and terminating access services. Because of the regulatory tradition of requiring uniform or average prices for retail telecommunications services, the practice of relating prices to costs is sometimes known as de-averaging, even though in the case of new services like ULLS there is no existing average price to de-average. There are four main reasons for why a de-averaged approach is more efficient: Consistent With the Commissions Principles A de-averaged approach is consistent with the Commissions standard approach to access pricing that relates to the direct costs of service supply and promotes economic efficiency of infrastructure use and investment. De-averaging of access pricing at the network level has acceptance in the market in spite of the existence of price controls that promote averaging of prices at the retail level and where there is potentially a much greater impact in terms of the number of end-users affected. Given the price constraints evident on voice-based services, these (de-averaged) prices also include an access deficit component. Investment efficiency A geographically de-averaged approach to pricing is less likely to distort either the build-buy decision of competitors or Telstras own investment plans. An averaged pricing approach, by contrast, is likely to result in inefficient investment decisions. Competitors less efficient than Telstra can enter into the high value customer areas and capture these customers by building their own infrastructure; leading to a greater duplication of the local loop in CBD and certain Metropolitan areas. Competitors will make more use of Telstras infrastructure in non-urban areas than is efficient and therefore make correspondingly smaller investments in terms of rolling-out their own alterative infrastructure in non-urban areas, even if such investment was cost effective. Less cream skimming Telstra has often expressed concerns about cream skimming, the practice of entrants targeting high call volume customers located in CBD and inner metro areas. Although both pricing approaches are unlikely to prevent cream skimming completely, ie entrants targeting high call volume customers, this outcome is exacerbated under the averaged approach as it would more seriously affect Telstras ability to recover its line costs both through line and call-related charges. This occurs because, in comparison with the de-averaged approach to pricing, Telstra will: lose more line revenue in those areas where the CAN is duplicated, typically involving higher-yield customers; gain insufficient line revenue to recover costs in those areas where line charges are priced below costs (typically involving lower-yield customers); and lose more calls to competitors in both the areas where the CAN is duplicated and where its infrastructure is used to provide ULL services below cost. This will mean that Telstras own customers across a range of its existing services are likely to bear an increasing share of line costs and make it more difficult for Telstra to remain competitive in the longer term. Other technologies more suitable in rural and remote areas The ULL is most suitable for providing high-speed services in CBD and Metropolitan areas. In many regional and remote areas such as outside provincial areas, high-speed services are more likely to be appropriately delivered by alternative technologies such as satellite or newer generation wireless networks. The correct, cost-based pricing of the ULL in these areas will help to ensure that the correct incentives are faced for the deployment of such alternative technologies for the benefit of end-users. This means that, in addition to the above effects on efficient supply, an averaged approach to ULL pricing, far from ensuring affordable high-speed services for regional and remote consumers, would likely lead to inadequate provision of such services to these customers. The correct, cost-based pricing of the ULL (copper network) in these areas will help to ensure that the right incentives are faced for the deployment of such alternative technologies for the benefit of these end-users. The Commission supports Telstras de-averaged pricing approach for this service. Access Deficit Contribution As a consequence of retail pricing regulation Telstra is unable to retrieve the full costs of the customer access network (CAN) from customer access charges. The resulting access deficit (AD) was traditionally retrieved by Telstra through an element in its service or call prices. This practice has effectively been continued by the Commission allowing an access deficit contribution (ADC) in call related access prices charged to service providers using the CAN. Effectively this has meant that the access deficit is retrieved from all services using the CAN (including those exclusively provided by Telstra) at the same rate per minute. Telstra has argued also for including an access deficit component in ULL pricing. In effect it is arguing: that providing ULL access will result in it losing lines that yield above-average service revenues, ie the access deficit contribution from call charges over these lost lines results in an access surplus in respect of these lines; the access surplus from these lines reduces access deficit in respect of other lines (ie it cross-subsidises the cost of providing lines to other end users); and loss of these (access surplus) lines through the provision of ULLS to competitors would leave the AD underfunded unless there is an AD component in the ULL price. Differences in Telstras ADC Case with the Commissions previous ADC Approach The case for including an ADC in the ULL access price made by Telstra is somewhat different to that previously made in respect to declared PSTN (voice) services in three main respects: First, the ADC would be recovered from the access price, ie. on a per line basis, rather than a component of a service or call price. All previous access deficit inclusions accepted by the Commission have been on a consistent per-minute and per call basis across services. That said, recovering the AD on a per line basis, per se, does not pose any particular issues for the Commission; Second, at first appearance pricing ULL at full TSLRIC+ is part of a solution to the access deficit problem rather than a cause there is no access deficit with ULL access per se but there is an access deficit on the lines displaced. Third, the approach is inconsistent with the Commissions legislative requirement to consider only the direct costs of access provision. As stated in the explanatory memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Act 1997: direct costs of providing access are intended to preclude arguments that the provider should be reimbursed by the third party seeking access for consequential costs which the provider may incur as a result of increased competition in an upstream or downstream market. The ADC sought by Telstra constitutes a consequential cost rather than a direct cost, and would therefore not appear to be admissible under the direct-cost-only rule. Consequences of Rejecting Telstras Case The combined omission of an ADC from the ULL price and continuing to only allow retrieval of the access deficit through uniform per-minute/per call surcharges on all calls made using the Telstra PSTN, whether directly supplied by Telstra or by other carriers and service providers, has conflicting effects on the efficiency of telecommunications pricing: It would avoid the distortion of the ULL price by excluding an element that would increase its price above the cost to the economy of providing it. However, it is likely to increase the per-line AD for PSTN lines resulting in a greater efficiency loss from voice service pricing. This may also artificially encourage the use of ULL to provide voice services, although the impact of this would depend on the degree of substitutability between PSTN and ULL voice services. In the past the Commission has accepted an ADC as a component of access prices based on what is essentially a second-best argument. The first-best approach to the access deficit would be for Telstra to retrieve the full costs of providing customer access from customer access charges, thus resulting in the elimination of the customer access deficit. However, under existing price capping regulations the scope for Telstra to increase customer access prices is limited. ADC - Conclusions In the past the Commission has allowed an ADC on access prices, but this has been a second-best approach to cost recovery resulting in higher access prices than would otherwise be the case. Allowing an ADC in the ULL price would not only mark a departure from past practice and may be contrary to the legislation, but would have, at best, ambiguous effects on telecommunications pricing. At this stage the Commission is not disposed to accept an ADC for the ULLS as it is not satisfied that any adverse effects on AD recovery caused by access seekers substituting the declared PSTN services for the ULL to provide voice services is likely to be significant. However, should there be clear empirical evidence that any such substitution of PSTN services for ULL services to provide voice calls was significant and was resulting in an inefficient use of network services and distorting infrastructure investment, it may be appropriate to review the matter. Chapter 4: Review of Telstras ULLS charges Introduction This chapter discusses Telstras key charges proposed for the provision of the ULL service along with the Commissions preliminary views of how these proposed charges compare with the previous pricing work undertaken by the Commission for declared PSTN services, as appropriate. It should be noted that while this will involve a review of Telstras proposed charges, this work is preliminary and partial in nature and does not purport to be a comprehensive examination of all components of the ULLS charges and should not be compared, in this sense, to the scope of the work carried out as part of the Commissions formal assessment of Telstras declared PSTN (interconnection) access undertaking. Moreover, the comparisons of ULLS charges outlined in this chapter are not intended to suggest that the Commission has formed a concluded view on the quantum of the charges that should apply. As noted in the preface, above, the comparisons presented in this paper are intended to inform the market about the Commissions preliminary views about a range of pricing outcomes that should guide participants in their commercial negotiations for supply of the ULLS. As well, interested parties would have an opportunity to be heard in relation to the appropriateness of the application of these preliminary views in the context of any Commission determination of an access dispute or assessment of an undertaking. Telstra ULLS charges Telstra has proposed the following main charging components for the ULLS: Once-off provisioning charges of which the main charges are service qualification and connection charges; and Ongoing charges made up of network costs, ULL-specific costs and an access deficit contribution. The once-off charges are to be billed at the time of service provision and the ongoing charges are to be billed on a monthly basis. All the charges are applied on a per line basis. The connection, network and access deficit charges are subject to variation related to the geographic location of lines in accordance with four bands that are delineated on the basis of teledensity. These are: Band 1 CBD areas of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. Band 2 Urban areas of capital cities, metropolitan regions and large provincial centres (including other CBD areas not already included in Band 1). Band 3 Semi-urban areas including outer metropolitan and smaller provincial towns. Band 4 Rural and remote areas. It is expected the greatest take-up of the ULL service will occur within Bands 1 and 2. Telstras network charges also differ depending on whether the ULLS is provided at an RSS/RSU or an IRIM. In relation to the ongoing charges these relate to the following costs: network costs comprising the annual cost of PSTN lines to the level of the RSS/RSU or IRIM, including annual capital, O&M and indirect costs; ULL specific costs such as additional IT system and management costs required to provide the ULLS; and an access deficit contribution which relates to the expected loss of call revenue on unbundled lines acquired by other service providers for funding the access deficit on Telstras own PSTN line services. The Commissions review of Telstras proposed charges involves three approaches: comparing the network cost component of this service with its own preliminary estimates of Telstras efficient network costs using a modified version of the n/e/r/a model which was used in the assessment of Telstras most recent PSTN undertaking; comparing Telstras ongoing charges with those in other countries; and comparing various charges with retail offerings. The focus of this work is on Telstras proposed ongoing charges, and in particular, on the network costs that correspond most closely to the cost estimates derived from the Commissions n/e/r/a cost model. Ongoing network costs Telstras proposed ULL annual network costs in 2000-01 are shown in Table 1. These are the most significant component of the ongoing monthly rental charge and a key focus of this chapter. Table 1: Telstras proposed ULL annual network costs ($ per line) RSS/RSUIRIMAverage*Band 1272-272Band 2572414548Band 3763672747Band 4989989989Average*631543616* Using weights contained in modified version of the n/e/r/a model reflecting Telstras distribution of lines by band and current IRIM/RSS/RSU numbers. Ongoing ULL specific costs ULL specific costs proposed by Telstra amount to $11.42 per line per month across all Bands. These are intended to recover the following costs which are claimed to be specific to the provision of the ULLS and additional to any other DSL related costs: IT systems costs; wholesale management costs; ULL connection group costs; Fixed indirect costs. While these costs are claimed to relate to specific ULL activity, the Commission observes that they are nearly as large as the network cost estimated from the previous ԭ-n/e/r/a model, particularly for Band 1. Telstra claims that the costs only include additional ULL related costs, including indirect costs. Importantly, costs that are in fact attributable to wholesaling Telstras ADSL and related activities need to be excluded from these costs. It also needs to be ensured that any ULL specific costs included here are excluded from the wholesale sales and marketing costs included in ULL network costs (and shared with other services provided over the CAN). In the time available, the Commission has not been able to examine these aspects in detail but intends to examine them further in due course. The Commission considers that a specific ULL cost component is appropriate, but that Telstras estimates of these costs will require further scrutiny. Table 2 shows Telstras proposed average ULL specific charges expressed on an annual basis in relation to Telstras other ongoing charges. These are averaged as between RSS/RSU and RIM locations. Table 2: Telstras proposed ongoing ULL line charges ($ per line) Annual network* Annual ULL specificAnnual access deficit contributionAnnual totalBand 127213750459Band 254813750735Band 3747137-56828Band 4989137-561070Average*61613721774* Using weights contained in modified version of the n/e/r/a model reflecting Telstras distribution of lines by band and current IRIM/RSS/RSU numbers. Access deficit contribution Telstra has proposed that its ongoing monthly charges include an access deficit adjustment. This involves an additional charge of $4.18 per month for Bands 1 and 2 and a rebate (ie a negative charge) of $4.69 per month for Bands 3 and 4. Table 2 shows these charges expressed on an annual basis in relation to Telstras other ongoing charges. The structure of these charges is designed to compensate Telstra for the greater proportionate loss of lines in Bands 1 and 2. In these two bands it is claimed the average line and traffic revenues make a positive contribution to recovery of the CAN access deficit (ie more than recover line costs). In Bands 3 and 4, Telstra would be losing lines which on average have insufficient line and traffic revenues to make a contribution to the recovery of the CAN access deficit (ie these lines are cross-subsidised and the loss to an access seeker reduces the AD that needs to be recovered). As discussed in Chapter 3, the Commission considers that the case for an ADC has not been made for the ULL service, however, it is prepared to review this matter if there were clearly found to be significant effects on the use and investment of the network. The removal of the ADC from the charge would also have the effect of increasing the differences between Bands 1 and 2 on the one hand and bands 3 and 4 on the other. Comparisons of ULL Network costs with n/e/r/a-based cost estimates In order to compare Telstras proposed ULL charges with the approach it used to estimate line costs as part of its consideration of Telstras PSTN access undertaking, the Commission has utilised a modified version of the n/e/r/a model that was used previously. Line costs were estimated as part of PSTN undertaking assessment in order to determine the size of the access deficit contribution that should be made by access seekers. The line cost estimates arrived at for the final undertaking assessment are shown in Table 3 below. Table 3: Commissions estimates of annual line costs for PSTN undertaking assessment ($ per line) CBD156Metropolitan348Provincial310Rural/remote473Average346Source: ԭ, A report on the assessment of Telstras undertaking for the Domestic PSTN Originating and Terminating Access services, July 2000. As explained further below, in order to accurately compare the annual network costs for the ULL proposed by Telstra having regard to the Commissions previous costing work, the starting point was to review the previous TSLRIC analysis that was used for the PSTN undertaking. The Commission notes that this means taking the above n/e/r/a TSLRIC line cost estimates as a starting point as these relate to the local loop component of the PSTN service. This component corresponds closest to the network cost component of the ULLS. This line cost component can be said to represent the costs of an efficient network consistent with the Commissions TSLRIC methodology discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. It is then necessary to make certain modifications to the n/e/r/a line cost component to ensure it corresponds more closely to cost of supplying the ULLS. This approach is similar to a top-down exercise where a cost is determined through an analogous process and then modified depending on the characteristics of the service. For the purposes of this comparison exercise, such a top-down approach is considered to be appropriate. Changes to PSTN cost model The key changes so far made to the n/e/r/a network model are: the exclusion of costs associated with line cards; a reduction in the number of RIMs and IRIMs and an increase in the number of RSS/RSUs to more closely resemble Telstras current CAN configuration; the use of Telstras geographic line distributions by Band, based on line densities. It may also be appropriate to make other changes to the n/e/r/a network cost model to incorporate specific network factors that have not been previously taken into account, but which are relevant to provision of the ULLS and are not included in the specific ULL components of the charge. The Commission would be interested in any other cost factors that should be taken into account in this regard. Line cards Line cards are excluded on the basis that ULL lines are jumpered before they connect to Telstras line cards and therefore are not necessary to provide the ULLS. Hence they should not be attributed to the ULL service. The annual costs of these line cards are estimated by the Commission to average about $55 per line (including associated indirect costs). Revised RSS/RSU and IRIM/RIM configuration As discussed in Chapter 3, above, Telstra appears to have adopted a scorched node approach in relation to the supply of the ULL service for points of interconnection (POI) at existing RSS/RSU and RIM/IRIM locations, where the service will actually be provided. This appears comparable to the Commissions approach to PSTN interconnect, where the POIs are assumed to be at Telstras existing LAS or Transit Switch (TS) locations. However, under the standard n/e/r/a approach for PSTN services, there are assumed to be more RIMs and less RSS/RSUs than occur in Telstras existing network, which reflects a forward looking network for the PSTN service. Therefore, the n/e/r/a model has been adjusted to reduce the number of RIMs by 50 per cent and increased the number of RSS/RSUs as required to serve those lines which were assumed to be served by RIMs. If the Commissions PSTN configuration of RSS/RSUs and RIMs were used, this would not accurately represent the costs of ULL provision from RSS/RSU points from where the great majority of ULL Services will be provided. In quantitative terms, however, this change has only a relatively minor effect on network costs. It should be noted, however, that, at this stage, the Commission has not computed separate charges for RSS/RSU and RIM locations as the current model currently averages these costs and further adjustments would be necessary. Revised geographic line distributions The line distributions used for the undertaking assessment were based around the classification of Exchange Service Areas (ESAs) as CBD, Metropolitan, Provincial and Rural/remote. On the information available, the Commission considers that Telstras use of line densities may be a superior basis of determining costs of servicing particular areas as compared to the previous ESA approach adopted for the PSTN exercise. For example, the distinction between densely populated areas and other areas appears more rigorous than the old metro and provincial categories, where a greater level of cost averaging between built-up and less built-up areas was involved. Therefore the line distributions in the Commissions model were modified to reflect the line distributions in accordance with Telstras Bands. However, this presented some practical difficulties, particularly for Bands 2 and 3. The Commission was not able to accurately model Band 2 and Band 3 costs as the trench and cable distances were based on the distances that applied to the former Metropolitan and Provincial categories. In practice this means that the Commissions estimates for these Bands using its modified model will tend to overstate the cost for Band 2 and understate the costs for Band 3 To address this, the Commission estimates of line costs for these Bands have been extrapolated by calculating Telstras relativities of costs for Bands 2 and 3 as compared to its Band 1 (CBD) costs and applying these relativities to the Commissions estimate of Band 1 costs to obtain revised Band 2 and 3 estimates. This has had the effect of reducing the network costs in Band 2 and increasing the costs in Band 3 as compared to the unmodified n/e/r/a approach for the Metro and Provincial categories. Main Parameter Assumptions There are some fundamental areas of disagreement between Telstra and the Commission over modelling input assumptions which help to explain most of the difference in the Commissions estimates of efficient network costs. These are: the number of pairs per service in operation; the level of trench sharing between the CAN and the IEN; the approach to depreciation; the WACC employed; and the level of indirect costs. These issues have each been explored at length in the Commissions undertaking assessment and are discussed briefly below. SIO provisioning In relation to the number of pairs per service in operation, the Commission assumes a provisioning rule of 1.3 services in operation (SIO) which relates to actual services subject to performance or provisioning requirements as set out under the customer service guarantee. This compares to Telstras of 2 SIO. The Commission is of the view that 1.3 is sufficient to provide for operational requirements and that Telstras additional provisioning is to serve future demand, the costs for which should not be borne by existing users of the network. Trench sharing The level of trench sharing between the CAN and the IEN assumed by Telstra largely reflects existing rather than forward looking practice. The Commission has accordingly assumed higher levels of sharing in Band 2 and Band 3 areas than Telstra. Depreciation The Commission uses a tilted annuity approach to depreciation which leads to a smoothed depreciation expense over the life of an asset. Telstra uses economic depreciation which produces a higher deprecation expense in the earlier years of an assets life. The Commission is of the view that its approach prevents over-recovery of capital costs and more closely accords with a market-based pricing approach. The annuity approach also overcomes the year 1 problem that arises when using a forward looking TSLRIC model, which assumes the network is brand new in each year which would result in higher asset values (and capital costs). WACC The WACC used by the Commission is 10.5 per cent in pre-tax nominal terms. The equivalent WACC used by Telstra is [c-i-c] per cent and is considerably higher. The difference results from disagreements over the appropriate values of a number of WACC parameters that are discussed in Appendix 4 of the Commissions undertaking assessment. Indirect costs In relation to indirect costs, the Commission uses estimates determined by n/e/r/a of efficient percentages of indirect expenses to direct capital and operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses based on benchmarking with overseas telecommunications carriers. Telstra on the other hand uses current percentages of indirect expenses derived form its COA/CAM accounts. The Commissions average estimate for indirect capital is 4.89 per cent compared to Telstras [c-i-c] per cent. For indirect O&M the Commission estimate is 24.78 per cent compared to Telstras of [c-i-c] per cent. The Commission sees no compelling reason why it should change its position on these matters in relation to the ULL service. Telstra has also not provided a case that these parameters should be any different for ULL as compared to the PSTN interconnection services. The Commission has also not included the costs of a Network Termination Device (NTD) in its line costs. Telstra argues that this device would be included in a forward-looking PSTN in order to clearly demarcate the end of the network and to facilitate various competitive arrangements such as ULL. It is not clear that this device will necessarily be required for ULL and there does not appear to be any reason why it must necessarily be supplied by Telstra in this instance. The Commission would be interested in comments on whether the NTD is relevant to the provision of ULLS. Notwithstanding its relevance to the ULLS, the Commission remains open to persuasion that a NTD might have general application in a optimised PSTN. Commission Views The Commissions preliminary views in relation to how Telstras ULLS network charges compare with those under a modified n/e/r/a model approach, discussed above, and taking account of its views on other methodological issues as discussed in Chapter 3, are shown in Table 4 below. The charges have been derived as an average of the costs of ULL provision from RSS/RSU and RIM locations. Telstras ULL specific costs have also been included in the figures presented in Table 4, but should not necessarily be regarded as an endorsement of the magnitude of these costs. In addition, in this comparison, the ULL access deficit contribution has been removed. Table 4: ԭ preliminary average ULL line cost estimates ($ per line) Annual network Annual ULL specificAnnual totalMonthly total Band 111113724821Band 222213735930Band 330013743736Band 446813760550Average29513743236 Table 5 shows how the Commissions preliminary views regarding total ULL monthly charges by band compares to those proposed by Telstra. Both sets of charges in Table 5 are expressed as an average of RSS/RSU and RIM charges. It is clear that the differences are substantial and in overall terms the Telstra proposed charges are nearly double those estimated by the Commission. Table 5: Comparison of ULL monthly cost estimates ($ per line) Band 1Band 2Band 3Band 4Commission21303650Telstra38616989 The Commissions preliminary views in relation to ULL monthly charges in Bands 1 and 2 compare closely to business line rental charges of $25 per month (in all areas). The average monthly ULL charge by comparison is $36. Once-off provisioning charges Service Qualification Test (SQT) Telstra has proposed a SQT of $6.50 per line. This is based on an automated system where the set up costs for the automated system are borne by a range of Telstras services including ULL, ADSL and ISDN. By comparison, Telstras current PSTN churn service fee (involving partial debt severance) using an automated process is set at $6 per account or service. On the information to hand, the SQT charge does not appear unreasonable, but would need to be considered further. Connection fee This charge applies for each line and comprises: Order administration fee ($11); Cable jumpering ($65-$80 depending on Teledensity Band); Testing and tagging at customers premises ($17). The cable jumpering charge includes the costs incurred in jumpering the cable back to Telstras MDF when the access seeker forgoes the ULL service. The Commission accepts that this involves a cost that may not be able to be recovered from a subsequent reconnection fee occurring immediately or shortly afterwards and may therefore be legitimate to include in costs in this fashion. However this charge should reflect the likelihood or probability of the ULL being given up at some point. There is an issue, however, whether the cable jumpering fee is appropriate in situations where a line is transferred from on access seeker to another and where no re-jumpering or re-conection of the cable by Telstra back to its own MDF is necessary. It is also not clear why testing and tagging by Telstra is necessary at the customer premises. In respect to PSTN connection and disconnection, Telstra only charges its customers for connection. This does not however mean that a disconnection charge is not implicit in the connection charge. The overall charge of between $93 and $108 proposed for connection seems roughly in line with Telstras charges for similar services with respect to other products. For example, PSTN connection charges are $110 for an in-place connection, where additional work is required at the customers premises. The minimum connection charge British Telecom (BT) recently proposed for its ULL service in its schedule of charges submitted to Oftel was 130 ($A333) per connection. This charge includes the cost of the line test, MDF jumpering and order handling. It excludes the costs of disconnection and reconnecting the line to BT, which is an additional 20 ($A51). Oftel has not suggested in its initial views on BT charging structure for the ULL that these charges were unreasonable. It may be more efficient in some cases to charge a higher up-front charge and a lower ongoing monthly charge as appears to be the case with the BT charges. This is because the cost associated with supplying the ULL are in large part fixed. Charging a higher up-front fee to reflect this therefore sends the correct signal to the market about the underlying costs of offering the service and can help ensure that services offered using the ULL are priced in accordance with marginal costs. However, higher up-front fees may reduce take-up of the ULL service and deny the dynamic efficiency benefits that may arise from increased competition in the provision of services over the ULL. It is the Commissions preliminary view that the Telstra approach does not appear to be unreasonable. Charges for the ULL in other countries The Commission has gathered some very limited information of charges for the ULL service in a number of other countries to compare to those proposed Telstra. These are shown in Table 6. CountryMonthly ULL charge $A* CommentUK22-25 (averaged)BT proposed to Oftel that the annual rental to cover the network costs of its versions of the ULL service should be 115 pa ($A294) for an existing in-use line or 105 pa ($A269) for a spare or new line. Oftel's initial view was that the charges seemed reasonable, except that the charge for existing lines should not include the costs of the drop wires given that the regulatory regimes has allowed these to be recovered up-front and in full from existing customers. See Oftel (UK) Access to bandwidth: Indicative prices and pricing principles, May 2000 http://www.oftel.gov.uk/competition/llu0500.htm.Germany21 (averaged)Price based on LRAIC which excludes joint and common costs.Finland8-40Price based on current valuation of assets.Austria20Price based on current valuation of assets.Netherlands<24Price based on movement form historic to current costs over 5 years.Denmark13Price based on telephone line rental.US9-10Figures for Southwestern Bell in Texas, US West in 14 western states, Bell South covering nine southern states and GTE in California. Higher and lower rates were also reported in other States. See The Australian Financial Review Weekend 22-23 July 2000, p. 26.Source: Unless stated otherwise figures are taken from the European Commission, Director General Information Society, Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, Working Document, 9 February 2000. * Prices converted to $A using average exchange rates for June 2000 sourced from Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, July 2000. It should be noted that such comparisons should be viewed with caution. There is very limited up to date information on ULL charges being levied in other jurisdictions. Most comparisons that have been published relate to wholesale (bitstream) and retail services and even those charges that relate to the ULL are based on widely differing costing criteria. The above comparisons have been selected mainly because they appear to be based on some kind of incremental or current cost approach. That said, comparison of the above international ULL charges with those proposed by Telstra for Bands 1 and 2 places Telstras charges well above those in these other countries. Even Telstras lowest charge (for CBD areas) is close to the high end of those in these other countries. The Commissions preliminary findings in relation to monthly ULL charges would place Telstras charges for Bands 1 and 2 closer to the middle of the range of charges observed in these other countries. Conclusion In this paper, the Commission has presented its views on what it considers is an appropriate pricing methodology for the ULLS and concludes this should be based on TSLRIC principles, similar to what was applied for PSTN declared services. At this stage, however, it is disinclined to accept an ADC for this service, but supports the de-averaging approach proposed by Telstra. In relation to Telstras proposed ULL prices themselves, the Commission has compared Telstras network costs to the line cost estimates that would be derived from an appropriately modified n/e/r/a network cost model, which in most important respects was similar to that used for the PSTN undertaking exercise. This comparison is primarily intended to provide further guidance to market participants in their negotiations over supply to the declared ULLS. It is hoped that the scope of price differences that currently exists between Telstra and access seekers for supply of this service will be narrowed significantly. It may also assist Telstra in the provision of an undertaking relating to the supply of the ULLS. The Commission is not in a position to come to any definitive views about the reasonableness of the proposed Telstra charges at this time. It is possible that the n/e/r/a modifications discussed above may need further adjustment and that further scrutiny is required of the ULL specific and one-off costs. At this stage the Commission has no information to suggest that the ULL-specific and one-off charges, as proposed, are inappropriate. That said, the comparisons presented in chapter 4 tend to suggest that Telstras proposed charges are well above those derived by the Commission, having regard to its previous PSTN costing work, and are also high as compared to even the highest charges for ULL services that the Commission is aware of in other jurisdictions where this service is being provided.  See ԭ Declaration of Local Telecommunications Services, Report (July 1999) for full details of the Commissions decision.  Declaration report p.13  Section 152AB(1) of the Act.  Section 152AB(2) of the Act.  The Commission must also ensure that the terms and conditions in the TAF access code, in undertakings and any arbitration determination is consistent with any Ministerial pricing determination in place. See section 152CH of the Act.  Section 152AH(1) of the Act.  Section 152AH(2) of the Act.  Section 152CR(1)(e) of the Act.  For example, it would be allocatively inefficient for resources to be devoted to producing telecomunications services that society places a low value on, to the detriment of forgoing other services (including other telecommunication services) that society desires highly.  The Commission may also take into account access providers obligations to shareholders and other stakeholders.  Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Bill 1996 Explanatory Memorandum, at p. 44.  See also discussion of short-run and long-run incremental cost concepts in Chapter 3 below.  The words incremental and marginal are synonymous and are used interchangeably.  the TSLRIC+ or ++ terminology has also been used in the context of advocating a higher WACC component as compared to that embodied in the standard CAPM approach, however, that is is not the context being used here.  while it would be possible to vary the SRIC over time as capacity changes, this would result in a highly variable saw tooth effect in the price, which is impractical and more costly to implement.  The actual approach taken by the Commission under the ԭ-n/e/r/a PSTN cost model involves the allocation of three types of common costs: - common capital costs; - common operations and maintenance costs; and - common indirect costs only the third component, common indirect costs, are expressed as a percentage of capital and operations and maintenance costs. Common capital costs are allocated on a per line, per cable or per minute basis, depending on the asset concerned, while common O&M costs are determined as percentage of capaital costs for each equipment type.  see ԭ, Access pricing principles a guide, telecommunications (July 1997)  It should be noted that while the conveyance cost for declared PSTN services is de-avargaed, the access deficit component is not  This is not to suggest that duplication of the local loop in CBD and other built-up areas is inefficient but rather that average access pricing will encourage a greater level of duplication than is efficient.  The resulting cost now including the common cost contribution and the ADC could be called TSLRIC++.  for a full discussion of the ADC as it relates to declared PSTN services, see Chapter 7 (pp.24-26) and Appendix 2 (p.59) of ԭ Report on the Assessment of Telstras undertaking for the PSTN Originating and Terminating access services (July 2000)  This is inherent in Telstras previous argument to the Commission that as ULL is priced to recover the costs of the line, there would be no need to take account of the AD in ULL prices if the take-up of ULL was uniform .  Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Bill 1996 Explanatory Memorandum, at p. 44. Although the EM refers to consequential costs in other markets, it is in other (retail and wholesale) markets where the effect of lost lines, and AD contributions, is likely to be felt.  Telstras case appears to be based on the so-called efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) or Baumol-Willig rule that allows the incumbent the full opportunity cost of access provision.  If lines on which an access suplus is being generated are lost to competitors through provision of a ULLS, this may increase the ADC in respect of calls over the remaining lines since the costs of supplying these lines are no longer be partially subsidised by revenue from access surplus lines. While the total AD may fall, it will also reduce the volume of calls/minutes from which the AD is recovered, thereby increasing the ADC from remaining customers.  To the extent that Telstra does not raise customer access charges to the extent possible under retail price controls, the allowable AD is reduced by this amount.  see Chapter 1, above, for a description of these network points.  The contribution applies only to lines in Bands 1 and 2. Lines in Band 3 and 4 receive an access deficit rebate see also Chapter 3, above.  An alternative approach is to employ a bottom up approach which was used to estimate the efficient charges of the PSTN declared service. The Commissions purpose in this section, however, is to compare, on a preliminary basis, different ULLS cost estimates and a top-down approach is considered sufficient in this regard.  It is understood that Telstras Band 2 which is closest to the Metropolitan category in the Commissions model, has less outlying metropolitan areas and includes large provincial town areas that are not included in this category in the Commissions model. Telstras Band 3 which is closest to the Provincial category in the Commissions model, is understood to contain more outlying metropolitan areas and less large provincial town areas. Band 1 and Band 4 are believed to be similar, although not necessarily identical, to the Commissions CBD and Rural/remote categories.  See ԭ, A report on the assessment of Telstras undertaking for the Domestic PSTN Originating and Terminating Access services, July 2000.  Ibid.  Oftel, Op. 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