ࡱ> } ybjbj55 7__q  QQQQQeee8Aem==MMM(((OQ((QQMM'dQMQMzM/܆eN8j=0mrQ|(Z@4(((^(((m((((((((( : Public Submission to Water Market Rules Issues Paper by National Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX) Australian Market License Holder and operator of the Waterexchange Pty Ltd (WX) on 9 May 2008 Question 3 Water market and trading objectives 3 Are there any other factors that the ԭ should consider when interpreting the water market and trading objectives? When interpreting the objectives, the following should be considered: To facilitating the operation of efficient water markets and the opportunities for trading, within and between Basin States, where water resources are physically shared or hydrological connections and water supply considerations will permit water trading The interference of regulator in the commercial aspects of trading, Regulators operating and trading in the water market, Political competition between regulators, Unqualified intermediaries. To minimise transaction costs on water trades, including through good information flows in the market and compatible entitlement, registry, regulatory and other arrangements across jurisdictions A single, national lodgement system, A single national water registry. To enable the appropriate mix of water products to develop based on water access entitlements which can be traded either in whole or part, and either temporarily or permanently, or through lease arrangements or other trading options that may evolve over time A single national water registry, Licensing of exchanges, Licensing of brokers, Removing regulators from the operation of markets. To recognise and protect the needs of the environment Allowing markets to develop beyond annual spot markets, and into forward contracts and derivatives; which allows the environment to manage and acquire asset. To provide appropriate protection of third-party interests A single national water registry, Licensing of exchanges, Licensing of brokers, Removing regulators from the operation of markets. Question 4.1 Constraints on the parties to whom water can be sold 4.1 To what extent, and in what circumstances, is it appropriate for an operator to be able to impose restrictions on the parties to whom water can be sold? More specifically: What are the specific forms of these restrictions, and their implications? Water derives its value when it is ultimately applied to the production of a crop or environmental purpose. Intermediaries can therefore only hold water for speculative purposes and are ultimately at the commercial mercy of the ultimate user of the water. Repeated experience has shown that the average return on water investment is in the vicinity of three to five percent (non capital) and therefore not an attractive investment. Any tax benefit from a trade is ultimately earned by a user, not an intermediary. So there is no reason to exclude these people from the market, and they even add extra liquidity to flat markets. To what extent are these restrictions imposed to comply with or reflect jurisdictional requirements? What is the specific jurisdictional requirement and what is the specific restriction imposed? What are the impacts and significance of these types of restrictions in terms of achieving the water market and trading objectives and principles? Water will not become a viable investment option (and therefore attract liquidity) until the full suite of market mechanisms exist. At present there is a physical market only; and no forward or derivative markets to offset risk. This is directly attributable to state regulators repeatedly refusing to engage these markets. Regulators have the perception that if they lose control over the transaction process, they may lose the asset. Therefore the control lever of choice is the handbrake of transfer application processing. Question 4.2 Constraints on water exports 4.2 To what extent, and in what circumstances, is it appropriate for an operator to be able to impose restrictions on the export of water? More specifically: What other restrictions of this type are imposed by operators and what are their implications? Regulators apply the artificial or non declared restriction of delaying the processing of transfer documents. In times of low supply and reliability, unreliable document processing between jurisdictions is used as a physical management device. To what extent are these restrictions imposed to comply with or reflect jurisdictional requirements? What is the specific jurisdictional requirement and what is the specific restriction imposed? The restrictions have little to do with jurisdictional requirements, but rather political and/or commercial interests of the regulators. What are the impacts and significance of these types of restrictions in terms of achieving the water market and trading objectives and principles? The effect is to erode participant confidence in the market mechanism, and to stifle the development of water products beyond the spot allocation markets. I.e.: FWRs and derivatives. What alternate methods could be used to manage concerns related to water exports? The introduction of a national registry, with national document delivery and approval processes would alleviate these concerns Requirement on sellers to demonstrate how savings in water use can be achieved to provide adequate surplus entitlement to trade If a full suite of water products (physical, forward, derivatives) were allowed by the operators to be traded, impediments to trade such as demonstration of water savings become irrelevant. Loss of benefits associated with being a member once some water is traded outside the district Requirement to first offer water entitlements for sale internally That refusal to reciprocal trade and internal offer is used as a handbrake to blunt and control water trading. Question 4.3 Other constraints on trade and transformation 4.3 To what extent, and in what circumstances, is it appropriate for an operator to be able to impose other constraints, such as those imposed for operational and environmental purposes, on trade and/or transformation? (Where appropriate please identify the specific constraint to which you are referring) More specifically: What specific constraints are imposed by operators and what are their implications? Regulators routinely delay approvals of physical market trades to match inter-jurisdictional delivery constraints. In the current season, transfer approval times have varied between 1 and 105 days for the same process. To what extent are these constraints imposed to comply with or reflect jurisdictional requirements? What is the specific jurisdictional requirement and what is the specific constraint imposed? The constraint imposed is fusing to deal with transfer documents. What are the impacts and significance of these constraints in terms of achieving the water market and trading objectives and principles? The impact of the constraint is to erode participant confidence, especially inter-jurisdictional transfers, and thus promoting intra-jurisdiction trading only. What alternative methods could be used to manage the issues these constraints are intended to address? In what circumstances could delivery entitlements/capacity shares be employed? In all cases where there is competition for the physical delivery of the product. In what circumstances could specified trading zones be employed? Only when physical base requirements dictate that water cannot be physically delivered. Should operators have the option of employing restrictions temporarily or for transitional purposes? If so, in what circumstances and in what manner? When is it appropriate for an operator to impose other constraints? What are their effects? It is appropriate only at times of minimum base flows and deliveries. Are there problems transferring water between states due to these restrictions, or others? There are numerous problems, each used as a lever to control and regulate trade, but most are associated with a political or commercial decision made by the regulator. Are there other ways to prevent transformation and/or trade delays? Yes, A single national registry and document lodgement system. Removing regulators from trading in the product. Removing regulators from vested commercial interests in trading. When do you think trading zones should be allowed? Only when physical base requirements dictate that water cannot be physically delivered. Should operators be able to govern and impose their own restrictions (for temporary transfers) and/or should they even have this option? Give reasons. Operators should not have this option. Regulators routinely manipulate restrictions for any purpose and is ultimately used to achieve political or commercial outcomes in order to control the asset movement. This erodes participant confidence in the market, especially where inter authority transactions are involved. Question 4.4.1 Security for future payment of fees 4.4.1 To what extent do irrigators who elect to maintain their delivery entitlement following the sale of their water entitlement present a risk to the revenue security of an operator? Access by market participants to the full suite of water products makes both these questions redundant. If FWCs were allowed to trade between registries, then fixed deliver fees etc would be maintained by the vendor whilst allowing deliverable water to flow to its best and highest use.wether that be agriculture or for environmental purposes. Question 4.5 Administrative fees and charges 4.5 In relation to operators administrative fees and charges for processing a transformation and/or trade: What is the impact and significance of these fees and charges in terms of achieving the water market and trading objectives and principles? The fees are insignificant in terms of the overall process. Market participants are more concerned with timeliness of the delivery of water or funds, rather then the fee associated. Regulator fees vary between $0 and $500 per transaction to perform the same function. In the worst case, five separate fees can be levied by different regulators to affect a single transfer of water. A single registry and lodgement process would negate any issue on fees. In any case, fees should not be levied on a per transaction basis, but rather on the base volume of the transfer and be amortised across all trades for the season. 1 megalitre attracts the same fee as 1000 megalitres in most cases and is the single biggest impediment to trading for smaller lots of water. It is interesting to note that in most jurisdictions this mode of levying fees has only recently been abandoned. Do current fees and charges reflect operators costs No. If they do then the question must be asked about the back office efficiency of some of the regulators, when there is such a vast discrepancy in fees between regulators. Should the water market rules specify that these fees and charges be based on cost recovery? Yes. But they should be amortised across the entire season by each regulator, and not applied as a base fee to each transaction. This is the single biggest impediment to trade for small volume transactions. Are administrative fees relative to transaction costs? No. Transfer fees have no correlation to administrative effort as evidenced by the magnitude of the difference in fees between regulators. Are the fees negligible? Should they be applied? No, fees are not negligible when inter area transactions are factored. A single transfer may attract up to 5 separate fees which vary greatly in magnitude. Question 4.6 Cut-off dates and trading seasons 4.6 To what extent, and in what circumstances, should an operator to be able to specify cut-off dates for completing trades or define trading seasons? Do such arrangements act as a barrier to water trade? Yes Are these arrangements imposed to comply with or reflect jurisdictional requirements? What is the specific jurisdictional requirement and what is the specific policy implemented? Should operators be allowed to determine trading seasons and have the power to specify cut-off dates for water trading? Cut off dates are artificial barriers to trade that are used by regulators to control asset movement and have little value in storage/supply management. How would cut off dates etc pose a problem if trading between states/different areas? The application of cut off dates generates market shift and artificial water prices by manipulating the balance between supply and demand. Question 4.7 Interaction between operators and intermediaries 4.7.1 Do operators recommend specific brokers or exchange to irrigators seeking to trade? On what basis are any such recommendations made? Yes. Where regulators have a commercial interest in running and trading in the market, it is routine that the regulator recommend their own services over commercial parties. 4.7.2 Is there evidence that particular applications to trade are expedited or processed differently by operators due to those trades taking place through a particular exchange or broker? If so, what is the justification for this? Yes. Consider the current blowout in processing times. In Victoria the regulator took on average 2.7 day to process a trade in 2006. In the current season the average transfer time has been +38 days. At the same time, the regulators own commercial enterprise processes next day. This coincides with the ԭ / CNU investigation in 2007. Should operators be allowed to require irrigators to use a member of the Australian Water Brokers Association? In lieu of any other standard or trade regulation processes, regulators should be able to mandate this requirement. Even self regulation by brokers is better than no regulation at all. This guarantees: trust accounts fidelity funds insurance transparent disclosure of price and volume Should irrigators be allowed to use any broker / no broker and get the same treatment? Yes, provided the same participant protection is guaranteed. trust accounts fidelity funds insurance exchange licence financial services licences transparent disclosure of price and volume A clear distinction must be drawn between an exchange, a broker and a arbitrage trader, as exists in every other functional market If operators did use their own exchanges or recommended category of brokers etc, would this make things quicker or do you believe that with such powers they could monopolise water sales/trades etc? Regulators should not participate in commercial aspects of water trading. For the market to function efficiently, and management options increase: the role and function of each aspect of the market must be clearly defined. Regulators should regulate Exchanges should exchange and hold AMLs Brokers should broker and hold FSLs The water market should be no different to any other market that currently exists. Clearly defined, licensed and monitored roles need to be applied.. History has repeatedly shown that transfers become less efficient when regulators become involved with the commercial aspect of trading. Question 5.1 Terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade 5.1.1 To what extent are operators terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade presently: Clearly specified? It varies between regulators, but in whole they are not clearly specified or communicated. Rules and conditions routinely change without warning during the life of any season. Comprehensively? No. In most cases terms are applied retrospectively in response to short term regulator need. Readily available? No. In all cases. 5.1.2 Should operators terms and conditions for transformation and/or trade be comprehensive and clearly specified as part of the supply agreement? Comments: Should there be a precedent for terms/conditions? Should irrigators get a say too, or should it be up to the operator? The terms and conditions of commercial transactions are the contractual business of the participants. The regulator should not be involved in any commercial aspect of the participants transaction. What are some conditions/terms that you think will make the process of trade/transformation more efficient? Clearly define and legislate/licence the roles of market participants. Removing regulators from the commercial aspect of the transaction would instantly remove barriers, (both perceived and real) and importantly allow markets to develop the full suite of water products; namely FWCs and derivatives. Question 5.3 Transformation and/or trade administrative process 5.3.1 What other actions (other than those identified above) may be undertaken by an operator to process and/or approve a transformation and/or trade? What is the rationale for this action? - Adoption of a watch list on none compliant users; as adopted by some regulators - Ability to overdraw an account in a short term - Pre approval of water available to trade 5.3.2 What specific information would an individual require from an operator before an application to transform and/or trade is prepared? Do operators readily provide this information (i.e. in a timely manner and at a minimal cost)? Volume only. No 5.3.3 What is the minimum information an operator would need to obtain from an applicant to enable transformation and/or trade to take place? Volume and account number 5.3.4 Is there merit in developing transformation and trading application forms that are standardised across operators? If so, what information would be required in these forms? No. With vast differences in the class and deliverability of water, this would become an impediment to trade. A national registry and lodgement system alleviates application form Differences. 5.3.5 Are operators processes for transformation and/or trade approval efficient? How could these processes be streamlined? No. Current systems are designed to satisfy internal back office requirements, and not necessarily participant needs. All that is required is the removal of regulators commercial interest from the process, and efficiency gains would immediately follow. 5.3.6 If applicable, what is the rationale for requiring board (or senior executive) approval as part of the transformation and/or trade process? The rational is to politicise the process and to therefore further act a lever to control water movement. 5.3.7 Is there merit in operators being required to identify which transformation and/or trading processes are in place to comply with state legislation and policies? No. It is little value because compliance cannot be measured externally at the moment. But conversely there is merit if it was a nationally auditable process. The only interest that the irrigator has is speed of transfer, resulting in delivery of water or proceeds. The process is irrelevant to the irrigator, it is the efficiency of the result that matters. The irrigator has an interest in the commercial regulation of the transfer. i.e. fidelity funds, regulated brokers, licensed exchanges. An operator has the power to check and approve an application. Should the irrigator also be able to do their own checks? Examples The irrigator should have access to a functional registry of their current title position. It is the clear role of the regulator to mange the accountancy of the transaction What information do irrigators want in order to apply to trade etc? Clear proof of title to entitlement and volume of allocation, both current and future. What information should an irrigator be able to have on the application form? Account number and volume for trade Is the approval turn-around quick and efficient at the moment? No. The approval transfer process is used as a lever to control trade, both from an operational and commercial perspective. Consider that a allocation transfer in Victoria in 2006 took on average 2.7 days to process, in 2007 took 6.7 days and was then subject to an ԭ / competitive neutrality unit complaint resulting in a turnaround time of +38 days in the current season. At the same time the regulator boasts a turn around of under 5 days in their own internally operated system. Over 100,000 additional pieces of paper were generated in Victoria this season by WX that didnt exist in the previous season. Compare this performance with Murrumbidgee Irrigation Limited, with an error free turn around time of 1point 3 days, doing exactly the same work. Question 5.4 Timeliness 5.4.1 Are the transformation and/or trading approval processes of operators undertaken in a reasonable timeframe? When the seasonal average turnaround time of transfers can vary (this season) between 1.3 and 40 days (with some trades going +100), it is clear to see that some regulators need to improve performance. It is interesting to note, that the regulators with blurred boundaries (dual roles of regulator, market, trader) generally are found at the inefficient end of the processing time comparison. 5.4.2 If the water market rules were to prescribe time limits for processing transformation and trading applications upon receipt of a correctly completed application: Prescribing time limits would act slow average processing times. The lowest common denominator would be adopted as the processing turn around target. What factors should be considered in determining these time limits? At what point would the process for transformation and/or trade be deemed to commence and at what point would it be deemed to have been completed? The participants measure the timeframe from when they enter into a contractual arrangement until either water appears on his account or money in the bank. The participant judges the entire process, not just the regulators performance. What should the time limits be? History has proven that there is absolutely no reason that transfers can not be achieved on the same day. Any prescribed timeframe would always be the lowest common denominator Are there any other issues associated with this approach? Participants dont want timeframes, just best practice throughout all regulators, and a clear definition of roles. 5.4.3 To what extent do operators provide information on the time taken to process and give effect to transformation and/or trade approvals? To whom do they provide this information and how frequently? Regulators give no information back to the market participants, and internal reporting of transaction times generally vary greatly from the commercial reality and are routinely fudged. The court of public opinion is the only current judge of transaction time. Question 5.5 Operators water registers and accounts 5.5.1 Should requirements be placed on operators in the development and operation of their water registers and water accounts? If so, what should these water registers and water accounts record? Establishing a single, national register is the priority, and integrating data between it and the regulating authorities is the prime requirement. This integrated system would still allow for the same regulatory manipulation from the base supplier of data that currently exists. However, it would still be a quantum leap from the current situation, and if speed to market dictates this option, then it would be widely supported. 5.5.2 Is the interoperability and/or compatibility between the water registers and accounts of operators and jurisdictions a significant issue? To what extent are operators registers and accounts interoperable and/or compatible with those of MDB jurisdictions? There is zero compatibility in practice. At present the political will for compatibility does not exist with some regulators; and any recalcitrancy means no functional registry. Has a lack of interoperability and/or compatibility contributed to duplication in processes and/or impacted on the timeliness of information provided? There is mass duplication of processes, and this the direct cause of the current unreliable transfer system. 5.5.3 Is the timeliness with which operators update their water registers and accounts a significant issue? How frequently are operators registers and water accounts updated? Random standards currently exist between regulators. Should the water market rules prescribe time limits for the updating of registers and accounts? If so, what should these be? Yes, as close to real time as possible, but definitely within a 24hour maximum. 5.5.4 Is it possible to gain direct access to information contained in an operators registers and/or accounts and who can currently directly access this information? Should all or some of this information be publicly available or available to specific market participants? The information is sensitive and belongs only to the owner of the information and his assignees. Question 5.6 Market Information 5.6 In relation to water market information (i.e. volume and/or prices of irrigation rights and/or water access entitlements traded within, into and out of their area of operations): Is adequate market information currently available from operators? Water market data reporting is corrupt. In the absence of penalty, many spurious claims are made and become fact. Take for example the current reporting of one Irrigation Corporations trades by an arbitrage broker/trade of the claim to have transacted +80k mega litres of water in that region in the current season, when the current total allocation allowance was less than 50K. These figures were widely publicised in the district as a means for the trader to tout for future business, but significant collateral damage was done to the corporations reputation. This trader of course acts outside the AWBAs code of ethics. What information do operators collect or could they collect? Regulators routinely demand data that they are not entitled to. Information about the other regulators participant is requested. Non compliance with this request can lead to transaction failure. Should operators be required to provide market information and what should this include? Regulators should provide market information but only to the extent of volume. Whilst some regulators continue to operate and trade on the markets, they should not be privy to participants private contractual arrangements regarding price. Is this information available from other sources? Yes. But it mostly corrupt. In the absence of penalty, many spurious claims are made and become fact. Take for example the current reporting of one Irrigation Corporations trades by an arbitrage broker/trade of the claim to have transacted +80k mega litres of water in that region in the current season, when the current total allocation allowance was less than 50K. These figures were widely publicised in the district as a means for the trader to tout for future business, but significant collateral damage was done to the corporations reputation. This trader of course acts outside the AWBAs code of ethics. Should this information be publicly available or provided on some other basis? Yes. From the national, monitored, independent registry: when implemented. Is there any market information that operators should not be required to provide? Regulators should only be required to provide data relevant to their operation, which is the volume. Other transfer information is the property of the participants. Question 7.1 Coverage of the water market rules 7.1.1 To what extent should the water market rules apply to all operators in the same degree? Should any distinctions between classes of operators be based on the number of customers serviced, the volume of entitlements or another characteristic of the operator? Yes, obviously regulators have different financial bases, but all have the same compliance requirements, Size should be measured by volume of through put. 7.1.2 Is there merit in a delayed application of the water market rules for specific classes of operators? If so, on what basis should operators be classified? No, definitely not. All systems are currently ready or available. Everything bar the political will. Question 7.2 Transitional Arrangements 7.2.1 Do contracts between an operator and its customers or members have a scheduled end date? If not, what circumstances can existing terms and conditions be reviewed? The contractual arrangements are between the participants, and they alone should determine the terms. It is not the role of the regulator to be involved in commercial aspects of a transaction. Question 7.3 Monitoring compliance with the water market rules 7.3.1 To what extent is the conduct of operators (relevant to the matters the water market rules may relate to) currently monitored? Regulators in most cases self monitor, with little or no outside monitoring. This is evidenced by the disconnect between staff and processes in some regulators, where it is very much a case of the tail wagging the dog. The current crisis in the water markets has developed because regulators have been largely un monitored and unaccountable.     PAGE   DEGHs  ƿƲ۩󢙍rcXLch6Shiq6OJQJhhOJQJhyhiqB*OJQJph3fhyh^@B*OJQJph3fhh^@5OJQJhiqh^@5OJQJh^@5OJQJ hiqhsh5OJQJhZ5OJQJhiq hiqhiqhiqhiq5CJ aJ hiq5OJQJhiqhiq5OJQJhiqh6j5OJQJhiqhZ5OJQJ     EFGHs$a$gdiqgdiq$a$gdk$a$gd $$Ifa$gdgd^@$a$gdk$a$gdk$a$gd$a$gdiq      K u ssss & Fn^ngd & FgdiqgdZgd^@gdkikd$$IfTl J! t0644 laT U V { %&\]78 & F ^`gd#PUh^hgdiq@ ^@ gdiq8^8gdiq & Fn^ngd & Fgdiq^gdiq U V %&[\]78)ʾʾwldUIh6Sh6S6OJQJhyh6SB*OJQJph3fh.OJQJhhv\ROJQJhhv\R5OJQJhhz5OJQJhiqhv\R5OJQJhiqh.5OJQJhOJQJhyhnB*OJQJph3fh6Shn6OJQJh6Shiq6OJQJhhOJQJhyhiqB*OJQJph3fhyhB*OJQJph3f8[spkkgd6Sikd{$$IfTl J! t0644 laT $$Ifa$gd $^a$gdk & F n^ngd uv:;< $$Ifa$gdgd9M^n^ngd^gd6Sn^ngd & F"gd6S )Istv:<$.OP~¶tҀe\\hy6OJQJh6Sh6SB*OJQJph1hh6S6OJQJh6OJQJhiqhOJQJhhOJQJhh5OJQJhiqh9M^OJQJhiqh5OJQJhkOJQJh6SOJQJhyh6SB*OJQJph3fh6S6OJQJh6Sh6S6OJQJh6OJQJP{{{8^8gd & F#gd6Sgd6Sgd9M^ikd$$IfTlSz%'! t0644 laT T]lmn  O̷wldYMAhh}_5OJQJhiqh}_5OJQJhiqhkOJQJh}_OJQJhiqhj-xOJQJhiqhnOJQJh6Shn6OJQJhyhj-xB*OJQJph3fhyhnB*OJQJph3fhiqhOJQJhyhj-x6OJQJh6OJQJhy6OJQJhyh6SB*OJQJph3fh6Sh6SB*OJQJph1hB*OJQJph1mn  O $$Ifa$gd^gdj-xp^pgdnn^ngd & Fgdj-xgd}_8^8gdy D s!5"w"x"##${rm{gd6H8^8gdy8^8gdy & F$gd6Sgd6Sh^hgd0ekdv$$Ifl'' t0644 la  r!s!5"v"x"#####W$$$$A%B%%%6&|&}&&'''''((v(w(x(())))ۺۺۺꢖvghyhzB*OJQJph3fh6Shz6OJQJhn6OJQJhiqhnOJQJh6Shn6OJQJhzhnB*OJQJph3fh6OJQJhz6OJQJhyh6HB*OJQJph3fhy6OJQJhyh6SB*OJQJph3fhiqh0OJQJhh}_OJQJ($W$$$B%%%6&|&}&&'''(6(w(x(())gdnh^hgdn & Fgdn^gdnn^ngd & Fgdsh^hgd0 & F$gd6S8^8gdz & F&gd6S))**** ++++++iddddgd6Sgkd$$Ifl'' t0644 la $$Ifa$gd$a$gdk^gdnn^ngd & Fgdn )))**K***** +++++#-$-%-&-3-S-T-U-M.0¶|mbVJ?hhQ5OJQJhhQ55OJQJhiqhH\5OJQJhiqhnOJQJhiqh B*OJQJph3fh6Sh 6OJQJh6SOJQJh:h6SB*OJQJph3fh6SB*OJQJph1hhtu*OJQJhhtu*5OJQJhiqhtu*5OJQJhiqhkOJQJhnOJQJh:6OJQJhz6OJQJhhn6OJQJ+#-$-%-&-3-S-T-U-Y--M.sk & F'gd6Sgkdi$$Ifl'' t0644 la $$Ifa$gdgdY<gd6Sgd n^ngd M.0112233444U5V5W5d55 $$Ifa$gdgdH\^gdsn^ngd & Fgdn8^8gdA? & F'gd6S8^8gd:0011111222333444U5W5c5d5555ϷϷti]RFh6SB*OJQJph1hhQ5OJQJhhQ55OJQJhiqhH\OJQJhiqhH\5OJQJhk5OJQJhiqhsOJQJh6Shn6OJQJhA?hnB*OJQJph3fh6SOJQJhA?6OJQJh:h6HB*OJQJph3fh:h6SB*OJQJph3fh:h:B*OJQJph3fh:6OJQJh6H6OJQJ55556U6Y6Z6777 8xskbn^ngd & FgdngdH\^gd6H8^8gdA? & F(gd6Sgd6Sgkd$$Ifl'' t0644 la 5T6U6X6Y6Z6777 8!8w899999B9C9D99}:̽𮟓ul`TI=h6SB*OJQJph1hhQ5OJQJhhQ55OJQJhiqhH\5OJQJh6S5OJQJhiqhkOJQJhnOJQJhiqhsOJQJh6Shn6OJQJhA?hnB*OJQJph3fhA?hH\B*OJQJph3fh6Sh6HB*OJQJph1hA?hA?B*OJQJph3fhA?6OJQJh6SB*OJQJph3fhA?h6SB*OJQJph3f 8!8w89999B9C9D9J9c^^gd6Sgkda$$Ifl'' t0644 la $$Ifa$gdgdH\h^hgdnn^ngd & Fgdn^gds J99~::f;<'==>>>D>E>>>>>??1?\???@gdngd;- ^ gd;-n^ngd & Fgdn8^8gdA?gd6S}:~:f;s<<<<<'====>>D>E>>??@AAAAAACBBBBCCCϾϚώtitϣϣi]ϣώUhnOJQJhhn6OJQJhiqhnOJQJh;-hnB*OJQJph3fhiqhsOJQJh6Sh;-6OJQJhn6OJQJh6Shn6OJQJhA?hnB*OJQJph3fh6SOJQJh6OJQJh;-6OJQJhA?6OJQJhA?h6SB*OJQJph3fh6Sh6SB*OJQJph1 @AAAAABCCCCSCTCUCxsgd6Sgkd$$Ifl'' t0644 la $$Ifa$gdgdH\gdnn^ngd CCCSCTCUCC{DDDDDEEEEEE+FGFRFFFFFFǸyn_SJSJSJSh 6OJQJh6Shn6OJQJh hnB*OJQJph3fhiqhnOJQJh h6jB*OJQJph3fh6SB*OJQJph1h;-h;-B*OJQJph3fh6SB*OJQJph3fh;-6OJQJh;-h6SB*OJQJph3fhiqh6SOJQJhh6jOJQJhh6j5OJQJhiqh'/5OJQJhiqhkOJQJUC[CCC|DDDDDEEEEEEEE+FFF_G^gdsn^ngd & Fgdngdngd6jgd6S^gd6S8^8gd;-8^8gd;- & F)gd6Sgd6SFFFFF_GLHuHHHHHHHHHHII>J?J)K*K9K:KKKLἳ}qbVGbVGbbh h B*OJQJph3fh6SB*OJQJph3fh h6SB*OJQJph3fh6SB*OJQJph1hh6jOJQJhh6j5OJQJhiqh'/5OJQJhiqh6jOJQJh6SOJQJhk5OJQJhiqhnOJQJh hnB*OJQJph3fhiqhsOJQJh6Shn6OJQJh 6OJQJh6OJQJ_GHHHHHHHHHHIngkdY$$Ifl'' t0644 la $$Ifa$gdgd6jgd6Sgd'/gdnn^ngd IIJ?J@JFJ*K:K;KAKKKKLJMWM]MMNNeOOOvPQfRgRgdn8^8gdq6gd6S8^8gd LIMJMVMWMMMMJNNNeOuOOOvPQQQQeRfRgRRSSS2T3TTTTT`UϺϺpdYpdYpdYpdhiqhsOJQJh6Shn6OJQJhq6hnB*OJQJph3fhiqh+OJQJh h'/B*OJQJph3fh+hq66OJQJhq6hq66OJQJh6OJQJhq66OJQJh B*OJQJph3fh h6SB*OJQJph3fh h B*OJQJph3fh6S6OJQJh 6OJQJ!gRRSSS2T3TTTTTWWWWW $$Ifa$gdgd'/gdn^gdn^gdsn^ngd & Fgdn`UaUUUUUUU@VAVW WWHWJWKWWWWWWWWkXYYYZZ3[4[ \\ȼ~vjaR~hq6hq6B*OJQJph3fhZv6OJQJh6SB*OJQJph3fh6SOJQJh7h6S6OJQJhq6h6SB*OJQJph3fh6SB*OJQJph1hh6jOJQJhh6j5OJQJhiqh95OJQJhiqhnOJQJhiqhsOJQJhq66OJQJh6Shn6OJQJh6Shs6OJQJ WWWWkXYYYZ4[x[y[z[xo^gd6S & F-gd6S8^8gdq6n^ngdgd6Sgkd$$Ifl'' t0644 la z[ \\\]]]^y^{^^F_K`L`M`Z`` $$Ifa$gdgd9gdn^gd6Sgd6Sn^ngd & F-gd6S\%\>\?\A\H\P\X\[\\\g\n\u\\\\\\\]]]^^y^z^{^F____4`H`J`K`L`M`Y`Z``ƷƷƷꠘxlhh6j5OJQJhiqh95OJQJhz5OJQJhiqh7OJQJhnOJQJhiqh6jOJQJhB*OJQJph1hZvh6SB*OJQJph3fh6Sh6SB*OJQJph1h6OJQJh7h6OJQJh7h6S6OJQJhZv6OJQJ'````GaabbbccdFezqz8^8gdZv & F/gdgdMn^ngdgdngd9ekdQ$$Ifl'' t0644 la `````Gasaabbbccc dd4dHdUdddFeeeeefpeVGVh@W`hsB*OJQJph3fh@W`hzB*OJQJph3fhiqhOJQJhZvh6SB*OJQJph3fh@W`6OJQJh6OJQJhZvhB*OJQJph3fhZvhMB*OJQJph3fhMOJQJhZv6OJQJh7hz6OJQJhZvhnB*OJQJph3fhZvhzB*OJQJph3fhiqh6jOJQJhh6jOJQJFeeefcffgfgggmghyhhhhhh$h$If^ha$gdgd9h^hgdn & Fgdz^gdsn^ngd & F.gdMgdz8^8gd@W`fcfffggfgggyhhhhhhhhhhhiiiiiĸи縥zqbSDSh@W`h6jB*OJQJph3fh@W`h?B*OJQJph3fh@W`h7B*OJQJph3fh6j5OJQJhh6j5OJQJhiqh95OJQJhiqhzOJQJhnOJQJhOJQJhiqhsOJQJhzhn6OJQJhzhz6OJQJh@W`hzB*OJQJph3fh6SOJQJh@W`6OJQJh@W`hMB*OJQJph3fhhiiii1lolplllqmvnee8^8gd@W` & F gd6S^gd6Sn^ngd & F gd?gd?gd9ekd$$Ifl'' t0644 la ikk0l1lnlolpllpmqmmmnnnnoppqqSqTqqqqqqqCrMrNrnrrrrrrɵɵɵvmmmahzh?6OJQJhz6OJQJhzhz6OJQJh@W`h?B*OJQJph3fh?h6OJQJh@W`hB*OJQJph3fh6OJQJh6SB*OJQJph3fhOJQJh@W`h6SB*OJQJph3fh6S6OJQJh?6OJQJh@W`6OJQJh?h?6OJQJ&qmmnnoqTqUqqqqqCrrrrrs $$Ifa$gdgd9gd?n^ngd & Fgdz^gd?gdn^ngd & F0gd6S8^8gd & F gd6Srrrrrrrsss%tttttttbuuuuuuuuuuuuvvvww]wɾ}ulaɾYl}hQ5OJQJhiqh?OJQJh6OJQJhsOJQJh?h?6OJQJhn6OJQJh?6OJQJh?hn6OJQJhh?B*OJQJph3fhnOJQJhh6jOJQJhh6j5OJQJhiqhQ55OJQJhiqhz5OJQJh5OJQJh?5OJQJ"sss$s|s%tttttbuuu{vvm^gdsgd?^gdsn^ngd & F gd?gdQ5ekd?$$Ifl'' t0644 la uuuuuuuv]w^w_wlwwwrgdnn^ngdekd$$Ifl'' t0644 la $$Ifa$gdgdQ5^gds ]w^wkwlwww$x%xqxtxxxyy}y~yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyȹtia]a]a]a]SMSM h60Jjh60JUhsCjhsCUhiqhP^EOJQJh?h6OJQJhn6OJQJh6OJQJh?h?6OJQJh?hn6OJQJhh6jB*OJQJph3fhh?B*OJQJph3fhiqh6j5OJQJhh6j5OJQJhiqhQ55OJQJh?5OJQJhiqhnOJQJwwww%xyy~yyyyyyy~ussss Dgd0h^hgdnn^ngdgd6jgdQ5ekd-$$Ifl'' t0644 la yyyyyyyyyy Dgd0 &`#$gd0 yyyyhiqhP^EOJQJhsCh65 01h:p0. A!8"#$% y$$If!vh5J!#vJ!:V l t065J!Ty$$If!vh5J!#vJ!:V l t065J!T~$$If!vh5'!#v'!:V l t065'!aTu$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'z$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'z$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'z$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'z$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'z$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'z$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'z$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'u$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'u$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'u$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'u$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'u$$If!vh5'#v':V l t065'^ 666666666vvvvvvvvv666666>6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666hH6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666662 0@P`p2( 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p8XV~_HmH nH sH tH H`H Normal CJOJQJ_HaJmH sH tH ^^ iq Heading 1$<@&"5CJ KH OJPJQJ\^JaJ DA`D Default Paragraph FontRi@R  Table Normal4 l4a (k (No List jj v\R Table Grid7:V0VoV P^EDefault 7$8$H$!B*CJ_HaJmH phsH tH 4 @4 0Footer  9r .)@!. 0 Page Number424 R.Header  9r @@B@ s List Paragraph ^VQV iqHeading 1 Char"5CJ KH OJPJQJ\^JaJ JJ@J iqSubtitle$<@&a$OJPJQJ^JJqJ iq Subtitle CharCJOJPJQJ^JaJHH 0 Balloon TextCJOJQJ^JaJNN 0Balloon Text CharCJOJQJ^JaJPK![Content_Types].xmlj0Eжr(΢Iw},-j4 wP-t#bΙ{UTU^hd}㨫)*1P' ^W0)T9<l#$yi};~@(Hu* Dנz/0ǰ $ X3aZ,D0j~3߶b~i>3\`?/[G\!-Rk.sԻ..a濭?PK!֧6 _rels/.relsj0 }Q%v/C/}(h"O = C?hv=Ʌ%[xp{۵_Pѣ<1H0ORBdJE4b$q_6LR7`0̞O,En7Lib/SeеPK!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xml M @}w7c(EbˮCAǠҟ7՛K Y, e.|,H,lxɴIsQ}#Ր ֵ+!,^$j=GW)E+& 8PK!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlYOo6w toc'vuر-MniP@I}úama[إ4:lЯGRX^6؊>$ !)O^rC$y@/yH*񄴽)޵߻UDb`}"qۋJחX^)I`nEp)liV[]1M<OP6r=zgbIguSebORD۫qu gZo~ٺlAplxpT0+[}`jzAV2Fi@qv֬5\|ʜ̭NleXdsjcs7f W+Ն7`g ȘJj|h(KD- dXiJ؇(x$( :;˹! I_TS 1?E??ZBΪmU/?~xY'y5g&΋/ɋ>GMGeD3Vq%'#q$8K)fw9:ĵ x}rxwr:\TZaG*y8IjbRc|XŻǿI u3KGnD1NIBs RuK>V.EL+M2#'fi ~V vl{u8zH *:(W☕ ~JTe\O*tHGHY}KNP*ݾ˦TѼ9/#A7qZ$*c?qUnwN%Oi4 =3ڗP 1Pm \\9Mؓ2aD];Yt\[x]}Wr|]g- eW )6-rCSj id DЇAΜIqbJ#x꺃 6k#ASh&ʌt(Q%p%m&]caSl=X\P1Mh9MVdDAaVB[݈fJíP|8 քAV^f Hn- "d>znNJ ة>b&2vKyϼD:,AGm\nziÙ.uχYC6OMf3or$5NHT[XF64T,ќM0E)`#5XY`פ;%1U٥m;R>QD DcpU'&LE/pm%]8firS4d 7y\`JnίI R3U~7+׸#m qBiDi*L69mY&iHE=(K&N!V.KeLDĕ{D vEꦚdeNƟe(MN9ߜR6&3(a/DUz<{ˊYȳV)9Z[4^n5!J?Q3eBoCM m<.vpIYfZY_p[=al-Y}Nc͙ŋ4vfavl'SA8|*u{-ߟ0%M07%<ҍPK! ѐ'theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsM 0wooӺ&݈Э5 6?$Q ,.aic21h:qm@RN;d`o7gK(M&$R(.1r'JЊT8V"AȻHu}|$b{P8g/]QAsم(#L[PK-![Content_Types].xmlPK-!֧6 +_rels/.relsPK-!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xmlPK-!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlPK-! ѐ' theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsPK] q  ))05}:CFL`U\`fir]wyy=BEGJMPRUWY\^acegilo 8$)+M.5 8J9@UC_GIgRWz[`Fehqmsuwyy>?@ACDFHIKLNOQSTVXZ[]_`bdfhjkmn !8@0(  B S  ?&4~K'4|K(t|K)~K*K+tKcc33OOqll33 O Oq9*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsplaceB*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagscountry-region9*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsState HG5qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq9AA 5 6 v !!"$$''555566666$6666667777717<777::;;==>>*6շI*-JJK1NNOZZffppııqqqqqqqǵqqq33333333333333333333333333333333333333336!!""&%%--..1144445556;;<===@@*C;CCCJJOOUUMXZX^_`ajjmm_oloqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq2e7fE/NXu]k`8*( ! < J;F&uV&F5@ Z"pJPV*7nJrsQ[F٨,g,{ VG\a!L^9S"tЄ6mS#,t9$#)2h6+fa;,j*i2nEi58IJ6R"3F7`M/D9Z0u9~v=:>)?B"ihC;6DcNH.ٲL' I`@dcJ*gL(XWO.5_'Qڈ] S֮8[U$f 9XŦ =^FEaRiy}n@Akn<:59vԬv`"%xtp,$*oah ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJo(hHhp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh ^`o(hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.hh^h`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h8^8`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJ^Jo(hHohx^x`OJQJo(hHhH^H`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`o(hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`5hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`OJPJQJ^Jo(-^`OJQJ^Jo(hHopp^p`OJQJo(hH@ @ ^@ `OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHo^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoPP^P`OJQJo(hHh^`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJo(hHpp^p`OJQJo(hH@ @ ^@ `OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHo^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoPP^P`OJQJo(hHh ^`o(hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH. ^`o(hH) ^`hH. pL^p`LhH. @ ^@ `hH. ^`hH. L^`LhH. ^`hH. ^`hH. PL^P`LhH.h ^`hH)h ^`o(hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHhp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHhP^P`OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh88^8`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh ^ `OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJo(hHhx^x`OJQJ^Jo(hHohH^H`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`hH)h^`OJQJo(hHh pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`hH)h^`OJQJo(hHh pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`B*OJQJo(phhHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHhpp^p`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh@ @ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHhPP^P`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh  ^ `OJQJo(hHh ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h&88^8`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(phhH-h^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh  ^ `OJQJo(hHh  ^ `OJQJo(hHhxx^x`OJQJ^Jo(hHohHH^H`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh8^8`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh ^ `OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJo(hHhx^x`OJQJ^Jo(hHohH^H`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh ^`5hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHhp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh8^8`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh ^ `OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJo(hHhx^x`OJQJ^Jo(hHohH^H`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHhp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hH ^`o(hH) ^`hH. pL^p`LhH. @ ^@ `hH. ^`hH. L^`LhH. ^`hH. ^`hH. PL^P`LhH.h^`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh^`B*OJQJo(phhHh^`OJQJo(hHpp^p`OJQJo(hH@ @ ^@ `OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHo^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJo(hH^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoPP^P`OJQJo(hH ^`o(hH) ^`hH. pL^p`LhH. @ ^@ `hH. ^`hH. L^`LhH. ^`hH. ^`hH. PL^P`LhH.h ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`o(hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`5hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`o(hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`o(hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJo(hHhp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh ^`5hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h^`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJo(hHhp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hHh ^`hH)h ^`hH.h pL^p`LhH.h @ ^@ `hH.h ^`hH.h L^`LhH.h ^`hH.h ^`hH.h PL^P`LhH.h8^8`B*OJPJQJ^Jo(ph-h^`OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJo(hHh ^ `OJQJo(hHhx^x`OJQJ^Jo(hHohH^H`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHhp^p`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHhP^P`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh ^ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hH2"pF5Ei5;,\a!NH59v/8*("%x6mS# S9$3F7#)LV=^]k=:hC' I 9X,gh6+u99S"J6dcJv*Eau/D98[Ue7Akn)?WOi2! J_'QDJ;Q[y}n 22         Gz        2p        Gz                 vy        .        ~*w        Gz        HOj7        NH                          Gz                 Gz                                                                       Gz                          .                                            vy        Gz                          T                 NH                 .        6Fn        '                 Gz        .        Gz                 Gz                          YXsA?EkZj(n) *tu*#-;-R.'/PY5q6u;?^@sCP^E6H7HZJ"@Qv\R6S#PU%T\9M^@W`6yd?e6jQnrj-x{+F9U%^0YnNG9 C?: ~`}_XZvzXE ?iqz.6zyH\Fc7Q Q5zfMY<qq@qx@UnknownG*Ax Times New Roman5Symbol3. *Cx Arial7K@Cambria5. *[`)Tahoma;Wingdings?= *Cx Courier NewACambria Math"1hSjFSjFIb&`9`99%84dGqGq 2QHX ?.2!xx0ACCC Water Market Rules Issues Paper, April 2008Matthew LorkinErica2                           ! " # $ % & ' ( ) * + , - . / 0 1 Oh+'0x  ( 4 @ LX`hp4ԭ Water Market Rules Issues Paper, April 2008Matthew LorkinNormalErica2Microsoft Office Word@G@@J!@J!`՜.+,00 hp  Synnex Australia Pty Ltd9Gq 1ԭ Water Market Rules Issues Paper, April 2008 Title  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnoprstuvwxz{|}~Root Entry FPI܆Data q1TableyuWordDocument7SummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8CompObjy  F'Microsoft Office Word 97-2003 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q