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(Submission by Email: <=
/b>water@accc.gov.au)<=
br>
<=
/span> Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission
GPO
Public submission to water market rules=
-
issues paper
by =
Peter
Murray
on =
9th
May 2008
The water issue is extremely complex
and calls for a unified and national approach. It is high time that unbundl=
ing
and water trading is seen as a
device for taking much of farmer’s water, diverting it to the urban
areas, thus forcing up the price of water and with it food to the detriment=
of
the masses.
For example the Northern Region
Sustainable
Within this grid the Sugarloaf Interconnector pipeline (to Melbourne) and the other pipel=
ines
planned to link all major urban areas of Victoria, together with the planned
link of the Murray system to the Goulburn system, are part of a grand schem=
e of
water trading, both intrastate and interstate. In highlighting the benefits=
of
expanding the water grid, the document reveals water trading as a Trojan ho=
rse
within rural communities and (the proposed Victorian) pipelines as a conduit
with vast potential for urban areas to outbid the rural areas for water.
Governments at all levels are compl=
icit
in this mishandling of our water resources which goes against FAO and World Bank Research that argues strongly that=
the
primary allocation of water between sectors has to be done by governments a=
nd
that it cannot be done by markets. This recognises that water is not a priv=
ate
good, but a mixed good with many public good characteristics.
Further; trading water from low val=
ue
to high value agriculture is a flawed concept:
· =
· =
Over investment in high value products (generat=
ed
from unfettered water trading) turns today’s high value products into
tomorrow’s low value products.
· =
Farmers
already act on market forces to shift to high value agriculture.
· =
Most
permanent water trade (until recent government intervention in the water
market) has been to managed investment schemes (MIS) that have been driven =
by
government tax breaks, not market forces. (Moreover many of MIS involve new
land opening for irrigation, often distant from major supply sources, with
consequent high levels of evaporation in delivery.)
· &=
nbsp;
Open
water trade has seen MIS, water barons, urban areas, industry and the massi=
ve
involvement of governments purchasing water for the environment, drive up t=
he
price of water beyond the reach of most forms of agriculture. (Given the effect of prolonged dro=
ught
on many farmers viability, with many receiving close to zero allocations ov=
er
several past years, many are forced sellers of water. This is inequitable a=
nd
leads to stranded assets and higher maintenance and delivery costs to be bo=
rne
by fewer consumers. It also has detrimental social effects on many
communities. (Basically the r=
eal
value of water, taking into account community benefits is substantially gre=
ater
than that being realised through the market.)
In a well based =
belief
that National Competition Policy in its present form is destructive of well
established farming policies and practices the following should apply:
1. Permanent water =
trade
must be restricted to within irrigation regions, to avoid stranding of asse=
ts
and collapse of regional economies.
2. The science of t=
he
health of the
3. Finally, water p=
olicy
is of such critical importance that the peak body (National
4. Finally, governments particularly in
5.
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